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VOLUNTEERING FOR EXECUTION:
COMPETENCY, VOLUNTARINESS




Eight men have been executed since 1976 when the Supreme Court
ruled, in a series of cases, I that the death penalty is constitutional so long
as its imposition is accompanied by certain safeguards.2 At one point or
another, all but three of these men not only "chose" to forgo further
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1 Robert v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
2 The eight men executed were Gary Gilmore, Jesse Bishop, John Spenkelink, Steven
Judy, Frank Coppola, Charlie Brooks, Jr., John Lewis Evans, and Jimmy Lee Gray. Gary
Gilmore was shot by a firing squad on January 17, 1977, after attempts to intervene on his
behalf were exhausted. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 989 (1976) (granting stay of execution);
Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976) (lifting stay).
Jesse Bishop was gassed to death on October 22, 1979, after efforts to halt his execution
were exhausted. See Bishop v. State, 95 Nev. 511, 597 P.2d 273 (1979) (affirming conviction);
Lenhard v. Wolff, 603 F.2d 91 (9th Cir.) (affirming denial of writ of habeas corpus and of stay
of execution), granting temporagy stay, 443 U.S. 1306 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), denying stay
444 U.S. 807, 444 U.S. 1301 (1979) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice).
John Spenkelink was electrocuted on May 25, 1979, after exhausting his remedies. See
Spinkelink v. State, 313 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1975) (affirming conviction and sentence), cert. denied,
428 U.S. 911, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976), fg denial ofstate coateral attack, 350 So. 2d 85
(Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 960 (1977), affg denial of habeas corpus sub nom. Spinkelink v. Wain-
wright, 578 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976, reh'g denied, 441 U.S. 937,
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efforts to contest their executions, but vigorously, and in the end success-
fully, opposed efforts by third parties to continue the battles in their
stead.3
Such instances of citizens "volunteering" to be executed are by no
means uncommon and certainly not "unique in the annals of the
Court."' 4 Prior to Gilmore v. Utah,5 the Supreme Court twice considered
appeals brought, not by the condemned men themselves, but by "next
friends' 6 attempting to intercede on behalf of the condemned men. 7
Other examples of this phenomenon have been documented both
before8 and after 9 re-imposition of the death penalty in 1976.10
denying appliation for stay, 442 U.S. 1301 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice), denying habeas corpuspeti-
lion and application for stay, 372 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 1979).
Steven Judy was electrocuted on March 9, 1981 after efforts to halt his execution were
exhausted. See State v. Judy, No. 580-S-128 (Ind. Jan. 30, 1981).
Frank Coppola was electrocuted in August, 1982, after his and others' attempts to halt
his execution were exhausted. See Coppola v. Virginia, 444 U.S. 1103 (1980) (denying certio-
rari from state direct appeal), cert. deniedsub nom. Coppola v. Warden, Virginia State Peniten-
tiary, 455 U.S. 927, afjg dismissal of habeas petition sub nom. Lawrence v. Mitchell, 73 L.Ed.2d
1394 (1982).
Charlie Brooks, Jr., was executed by lethal injection on December 7, 1982, after exhaust-
ing his remedies. See Brooks v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 1490 (1982) (Brennan, Marshall, and Ste-
vens, JJ., dissenting from denial of stay).
John Lewis Evans was executed on April 23, 1983 after exhausing his remedies. See
Evans v. Alabama, 361 So. 2d 654 (Ala. 1977) 361 So. 2d 666 (affirming conviction and death
sentence), denying stay of execution, 440 U.S. 987 (1979), denying petition for habeas corpus, 472 F.
Supp. 707 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd, 628 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1980),petitionforreh g denied, 639 F.2d 221
(5th Cir. 1981), re'd sub nom. Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605 (1982).
Jimmy Lee Gray was executed September 2, 1983 after exhausing his remedies. See Gray
v. State, 375 So. 2d 994 (Miss. 1979) (convicted and sentenced to death), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
988 (1980), afg denial of habeas corpus petition sub nom. Gray v. Lucas, 685 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.
1982), aft'd, 710 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1983), denying cert. & stay of execution, 52 U.S.L.W. 3169
(Sept. 1, 1983).
3 John Spenkelink and Charlie Brooks, Jr., were the only two of the eight to contest
expressly their executions to the end.
4 Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1013 n.1 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
5 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
6 For a definition of "next friend," see infra notes 210-15 and accompanying text.
7 See Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966) (per curiam), held without action on petition for
cert., 386 U.S. 989 (1967); Anderson v. Kentucky, 353 S.W.2d 381 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961), cert.
denied 369 U.S. 829, cert. granted, 371 U.S. 886 (1962), denying motion to dismiss petition, 371 U.S.
937, 376 U.S. 940 (1964) (continuing case "indefinitely"), denying motion for hearing, 377 U.S.
902 (1964), denying motion to correct continuation order, 402 U.S. 993 (1971). See generaly Note, The
Eighth Amendment and the Execution of the Presently Incompetent, 32 STAN. L. REV. 765, 768-69 n.23
(1980) (discussing Anderson).
8 See, e.g., Exparte Wood, 129 Tex. Crim. 422, 87 S.W.2d 487 (1935) (defendant con-
victed of murder permitted to withdraw his notice of appeal over his attorney's objection); Er
parte Maple, 116 Tex. Crim. 383, 33 S.W.2d 734 (1930).
Bernard L. Diamond reports examples of this phenomenon as early as the Hadfeld case
in England in 1890. Diamond, Murder and the Death Penalty: A Case Report, in CAPITAL PUN-
ISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 446-47 (H. Bedau & C. Pierce eds. 1976); see atro F. WHAR-
TON & M. STILLE, 1 MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE § 802 (4th ed. Philadelphia 1882) ("I fling
myself, not into the river, nor into the abyss, but upon the scaffold") (quoting Lord Clarendon)
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This Article examines this phenomenon and suggests that the
Court's response to it has been woefully inadequate. The Article begins
by examining documented cases by defendants or prisoners facing possi-
ble execution who express the desire to "waive" legal challenges to this
fate, or who affirmatively seek to force the State to fulfill its pledge to
execute them. Section II argues that such individuals fall into two usu-
ally inter-related categories: (1) those suffering from psychological ill-
nesses characterized by suicidal impulses who, for whatever reasons, are
unable to commit the act themselves and seek the State's assistance
through the death penalty; and (2) those suffering, both physically and
psychologically, from the combined stress of being condemned to die at
some indefinite point in the future while being confined for prolonged
periods in brutalizing and dehumanizing conditions on "death rows"
across the country.
Section III analyzes these findings under currently accepted legal
doctrines. First, the Article addresses the issue of competency and ar-
gues that competency standards must be flexible to reflect the impor-
tance of the decision sought to be waived or exercised. Because existing
(cited in Note, supra note 7, at 765); see also T. SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY 59 (1959)
(describing examples from past centuries).
9 See infra Part II.
10 Because of the extraordinary care now required for imposition of the death penalty, see
generally Dix, Appellate Review ofthe Decision to Impose Death, 68 GEo. L.J. 97 (1979); Gillers,
Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1980); Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons:
Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1980), it is somewhat surprising that this
bizarre phenomenon has not attracted more attention from criminologists and legal scholars.
The only legal commentary concerning the subject is a student note. Note, The Death Row
Right to Die. Suicide or Intimate Decision?, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 575 (1981) [hereinafter Note, The
Death Row Right to Die]. A few other authors have discussed the related subjects of the consti-
tutionality of executing a presently incompetent inmate of and death row stress, but they
have not focussed in detail on how these or other factors might affect an inmate's decision to
"give up" and acquiesce in his own execution. See Hazard & Louisell, Death, the State, and the
Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA L. REV. 381 (1962); Peltham, The Common Law and the
Execution oInsane Crininals, 4 MELB. U.L. REv. 434 (1964); Weihofen, ,4 Question ofJustice:
Trial or Execution of an Insane Defendant, 37 A.B.A. J. 651 (1951); Note, supra note 7; Note,
Insanity of the Condemned, 88 YALE L.J. 533 (1979); Note, Mental Suffring Under Sentence ofDeath:
A Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 57 IowA L. REv. 814 (1972) [hereinafter Note, Mental Suffering
Under Sentence ofDeath]; Comment, Execution ofInsane Persons, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 246 (1950).
Similarly, criminologists, to the extent that they have given any attention to the subject at all,
have focussed on the stress attendant to either being condemned to die or to life on death row.
See C. DAvIS, WAITING FOR IT (1980); S. GETrINGER, SENTENCED TO DIE (1979); B. JACK-
SON & D. CHRISTIAN, DEATH Row (1980) (conditions on death row in Texas); R. JOHNSON,
CONDEMNED TO DIE: UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH (1981); Gallemore & Panton, Inmate
Responses to Lengthy Death Row Confinement, reprinted in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 527-34 (H. Bedau & C. Pierce eds. 1976); Bluestone & McGahee, Reaction to Extreme
Stress: Impending Death by Execution, 119 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 393 (1962); Lewis, Killing the Kill-
ers: 4 Post Furman Profile ofFlorida's Condemned, 25 CRIME & DELINQ. 200 (1979); Else, Kudsk
& Meyer, Living Conditions of Death Sentence Inmates in the United States (Feb. 1981)
(unpublished dissertation, School of Social Work, University of Iowa).
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case law does not recognize this, courts fail to apply to competency the
extraordinary care employed in other death penalty contexts. More im-
portantly, competency tests in death penalty cases fail to take into ac-
count the "suicide"" or "murder/suicide"' 2 phenomena that is often
present. Second, and totally apart from traditional notions of compe-
tency, this Article argues that decisions to "waive" further legal chal-
lenges can almost invariably be traced to the unconscionable conditions
to which condemned are subjected. Inmates are put to the Hobson's
choice of prolonged torture by incarceration or swift torture by execu-
tion. An inmate's "choice" of the latter alternative over the former is no
more voluntary than a confession beaten out of a police suspect during a
custodial interrogation; only the method utilized to exact that "choice"
is unique.
Section IV argues that even if an inmate's decision to forgo further
legal proceedings can be deemed both competent and voluntary, recog-
nizing such a "right" cannot be reconciled with either the State's inter-
est in ensuring that the death penalty is imposed in a constitutional
manner or the federal interest in ensuring that the states themselves im-
pose the penalty in that manner. In contrast to the qualified "right to
die" increasingly recognized in the medical field, a convicted felon has
no "right" to determine his method of punishment. Moreover, the
probability of overturning a conviction or death sentence is considerably
greater than the probability of recovering from a comatose physical con-
dition. Hence, continued legal proceedings to determine the constitu-
tionality of a death sentence are neither legally nor morally the
equivalent of extraordinary life-saving measures imposed on a brain-
dead patient. On the contrary, they are required if the death penalty is to
remain a part of our constitutional fabric.
Finally, Section V explores the rights of third parties, such as rela-
tives and attorneys, to intervene both as "next friends" in the situations
described in the previous sections and independently to protect their
own interests-the preservation of family ties and the attorney/client
relationship from unlawful interference by the State.
I See infra notes 13-24.
12 Id. The "murder/suicide" phenomenon refers to the clinically recognized syndrome in
which an individual intentionally commits murder in a state with a death penalty hoping
that, once caught, the State will execute him and thereby accomplish what he himself cannot
bring about by his own hand. This is distinguished from the related syndrome prevalent in
death row inmates who actively challenge their convictions and sentences until the stress of
their status and the conditions of their incarceration make state-imposed "suicide" preferable.
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II. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE DEATH WISH: THE FRUSTRATED
SUICIDE AND THE MESSAGE OF DEATH Row
A. "MURDER" AND "SUICIDE" OR "MURDER AND SUICIDE?"
It is a distressing irony of death penalty jurisprudence that while
the sanction itself is upheld, at least in part, on the assumption that it
serves as a deterrent, the "right" of the condemned to demand their
executions is recognized, despite growing evidence that it actually in-
spires others to commit murder. The psychological basis of the syn-
drome has been succinctly described by George F. Solomon:
The close linking of suicide and murder is seen in the mechanism of seek-
ing to be killed, to be punished for one's own transgressions, particularly
for one's murderous feelings .... [M]any criminals leave clues, need to
confess, and seek punishment .... [M]urder can be committed either
consciously or unconsciously in order to be killed by the state .... 13
Perhaps the most well known example of this phenomenon is the
case of James French. In 1958, French was convicted in Oklahoma of
murdering a motorist who picked him up while hitch-hiking. At his
trial, he testified that he committed the crime in the hope that he would
be executed and begged for the death sentence. His attorney, however,
worked out a guilty plea with the prosecutor and French only received
life imprisonment. Three years later, French strangled his cellmate and,
when tried for murder again, urged the judge and jury to sentence him
to death. Although numerous appeals were taken by his attorneys,
French was ultimately declared sane and executed in 1966.14
13 Solomon, Capital Punishment as Suicide and as Murder, reprinted in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES 433-35 (H. Bedau & C. Pierce eds. 1976). Louis J. West has de-
scribed the syndrome in a similar fashion:
[Tihe death penalty breeds murder. It becomes more than a symbol. It becomes a prom-
ise, a contract, a convenant between society and certain (by no means rare) warped
mentalities who are moved to kill as part of a self-destructive urge. These murders are
discovered by the psychiatric examiner to be, consciously or unconsciously, perpetrated
in an attempt to commit suicide by committing homicide. It only works if the perpetrator
believes he will be executed for his crime.
West, Psychiatric Reflections on the Death Penalty, reprinted in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 426-27 (H. Bedau & C. Pierce eds. 1976) [hereinafter West, Psychiatric Reflec-
tions]; see also F. ALEXANDER & H. STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE AND THE PUBLIC
(1956); S. GETTINGER, supra note 10, at 123; K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT
(1968); T. SELLIN, supra note 8; F. WERTHAM, THE SHOW OF VIOLENCE (1949); D. WEST,
MURDER FOLLOWED BY SUICIDE (1966) [hereinafter WEST, MURDER]; Diamond, supra note
8, at 445; Zilboorg, Differential Diagnosis of Types of Suicides, 35 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGICAL
PSYCHIATRY 270-91 (1936).
14 S. GETTINGER, supra note 10, at 123; West, Psychiatric Reflections, supra note 13, at 426.
Dr. West interviewed French in 1965 and described his history of aborted attempts at suicide:
French admitted to me that he had seriously attempted suicide several times in the past
but always "chickened out" at the last minute. His basic (and obviously abnormal) mo-
tive in murdering his inoffensive cellmate was to force the State to deliver to him the
electrocution to which he felt entitled and which he deeply desired.
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Commentators have observed that "[t]he incidence of suicide-re-
lated murders is substantial."'15 According to California Department of
Justice statistics, some ten percent of the known criminal homicide of-
fenders in 1960 committed suicide after their crime.' 6 Some courts have
also acknowledged suicide as a motive in certain slayings. 17
As many of these examples illustrate, the impulse to murder is often
preceded by a history of failed attempts at suicide. Moreover, even
where there is no explicit link between the crime and the presence of
suicidal tendencies, such feelings are prevalent on death row, often tak-
ing the form of remorse. Professor Johnson discussed this behavior in his
study of death row in Alabama:
The crimes of psychotics often display purpose that relates to deep-seated
and volatile needs. These crimes are felt to be senseless because making
sense of them is too difficult or painful. Characteristically, this man speaks
of his inability to comprehend his crime. Yet he is obsessed with remorse.
Suicide, an escape from the crime and from himself, is a constant
preoccupation. is
Many of those who have attempted, both successfully and unsuccessfully
to cut off their own appeals since the re-institution of the death penalty
have exhibited such dysfunctional behavior. Gary Gilmore, the first
and most prominent of those executed in this era of the death penalty, is
a prime example.
Gilmore served more than half of his life behind bars, including
eighteen of his last twenty-one years. 19 He was last serving time in Ore-
gon, a state that did not have the death penalty, when he was paroled
prior to the incident resulting in his death penalty and execution. He
chose to be paroled in Utah, a state with the death penalty and "the one
place in the nation where blood atonement, in the form of a firing
West, Psvchialric Reflectionr, supra note 13, at 427. Such stories are by no means uncommon.
Gettinger, for example, also relates the story of a man in California who tortured and killed
three women, each time with the anticipation of being captured and executed. He reportedly
told a psychiatrist that "[w]hen I was planning the first killing, I was planning at the same
time what I was going to order for my last meal before the gas chamber." S. GETTINGER,
supra note 10, at 123; see also Diamond,supra note 8, at 447-57; Solomon, supra note 13, at 437;
Leavy, Execution: Trigger For More Violence? Gilmore's 'Success' in Demanding Death Could Backfire,
Los Angeles Times, Nov. 28, 1976, §8 at 5 (discussing other examples).
t5 Comment, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 CAL. L. REV. 1268, 1286 (1968).
t6 Id.
17 Id. at 1287. One example noted by this commentator is People v. Cash, 52 Cal. 2d 841,
842-43, 345 P.2d 462, 463 (1959).
18 R. JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 35. Thus, Johnson quotes directly from one prisoner he
diagnosed as falling within this category: " 'I think about killing myself every day. . . . If
I'd had to, if I'd known, or had any inkling or any idea that I was going to do something like
that, I'd have killed myself before I ever allowed myself to (kill them). . . . I think of suicide
all the time.' "Id. at 35-36.
19 H. BEDAU, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 121-23
(1977).
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squad, may be used to administer the death penalty for murder. '20 Dr.
John C. Woods, Chief of Forensic Psychiatry at Utah State Hospital
and one of the psychiatrists who examined Gilmore before his trial to
determine his sanity, concluded that Gilmore realized he was on a tread-
mill and "[k]nowing he did not want to return to prison, he took the
steps necessary to turn the job of his destruction over to someone else."'2'
Indeed, Dr. Woods theorized that Gilmore
went out of his way to get the death penalty; that's why he pulled two
execution-style murders he was bound to be caught for. I think it's a legiti-
mate question, based on this evidence and our knowledge of the individ-
ual, to ask if Gilmore would have killed if there was not a death penalty in
Utah.22
Gilmore also exhibited "erratic behavior" including a suicide attempt
while on death row.23
20 Id.
21 I. ISENBERO, THE DEATH PENALTY 91 (1977) (quoting Nordheimer, Death Wish Is Dis-
cerned In Poety and Killings of Doomed Convict, New York Times, Nov. 15, 1976, at 15).
22 Id.
23 Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); H. BEDAU,supra
note 19, at 122.
Another example of the "murder/suicide" phenomenon among recent capital defend-
ants is Arthur F. Goode, III. Goode, an escapee from a Maryland mental hospital, was ini-
tially charged with the murder and rape of a ten-year-old child in Florida. He fled to
Maryland where he kidnapped two young boys, killing one of them in Virginia. Goode v.
State, 365 So. 2d 381 (Fla.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979).
He was tried for murder in Virginia but "only" received a sentence of life imprisonment.
Thereafter, he gave a statement in which he demanded to be returned to Florida "so that he
could be convicted of Jason's murder and be executed." Id. at 382 (emphasis added). His
request was granted, and during his trial in Florida he gave a full confession in which he
expressed the desire to be convicted and executed. Id. The court ultimately permitted him to
fire his attorney and conduct his "trial" pro se. Id. at 383-84; see also State v. Aumann, 265
N.W.2d 316 (Iowa 1978).
Many others have exhibited the "remorse/suicide" symptoms described by Professor
Johnson. Indeed, Arthur Goode's decision to force his own execution appears to have been
the product of massive feelings of guilt:
[D]espite his insistence that he feels no remorse he does indicate that he still considers
himself to be dangerous and in a very vague way, but in a very true way indicates that
somewhere within himself there is the thought that he should not be allowed to continue
to go on in his present course which includes mental illness, which includes murdering
young children.
Goode, 365 So. 2d at 382.
A more recent example occurred in People v. Chadd, 28 Cal. 3d 739, 621 P.2d 837, 170
Cal. Rptr. 798 (en bane), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 930 (1981). Billy Lee Chadd, charged concur-
rently with capital murder in Nevada, pleaded guilty to first degree murder in California. 28
Cal. 3d at 745 n.2, 621 P.2d at 840 n.2, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 801 n.2. Prior to his preliminary
hearing, Chadd tried to commit suicide while hospitalized. When he then sought to dismiss
his attorney, his counsel objected, explaining: "This particular defendant's basic desire is to
commit suicide, and he's asking for the cooperation of the State in that endeavor." Id. at 744,
621 P.2d at 839, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 89. The following colloquy then ensued:
THE COURT: "Mr. Chadd, your counsel has indicated that you want to commit this
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B. "[I]F THEY COULD FRY ME TOMORROW, THAT WOULD BE
PREFERABLE TO SPENDING THE REST OF MY LIFE HERE.
THIS ISN'T LIVING. IT'S JUST EXISTING."
24
These comments by Charles Bryant succinctly describe the senti-
ments common among the condemned who have chosen to hasten their
own executions. Two factors contribute to such feelings: (1) the psycho-
logical stress attendant to living under a sentence of death, and (2) the
dehumanizing conditions of death row.
l. Stress and a Sentence of Death
It is difficult to imagine a source of psychological stress more exact-
ing than being forced to live the spasmodic certainty and uncertainty of
being sentenced to die.2 5 Professor Johnson, in his comprehensive study
suicide. You want to plead guilty and have the Court help you in doing that. What
about that?"
THE DEFENDANT: "Your Honor, it's true, I did attempt suicide. I have given serious
consideration to the consequences of the trial, the outcome, what it might be. I feel the
death penalty would be, for all intents better for me .... If the State of California
can't, and I don't receive the death Penalty, then I have got another shot in Nevada.
They're going to try for the death penalty, too. If that doesn't work out, then I will just
have to do it myself."
Id. at 744-45, 621 P.2d at 840, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
24 Death-Row Interviews, U.S. News and World Report, July 12, 1976, at 51-53 (quoting
Charles Bryant), quoted in I. ISENBERG, supra note 21, at 46.
25 Justice Stevens has observed:
In capital cases, however, the punishment is inflicted in two stages. Imprisonment fol-
lows immediately after conviction; but the execution normally does not take place until
after the conclusion of post-trial proceedings in the trial court, direct and collateral re-
view in the state judicial system, collateral review in the federal judicial system, and
clemency review by the executive department of the State. However critical one may be
of these protracted post-trial procedures, it seems inevitable that there must be a signifi-
cant period of incarceration on death row during the interval between sentencing and
execution. If the death sentence is ultimately set aside or its execution delayed for a
prolonged period, the imprisonment during that period is nevertheless a significant form
of punishment. Indeed, the deterrent value of incarceration during that period of uncer-
tainty may well be comparable to the consequences of the ultimate step itself.
Coleman v. Balkom, 451 U.S. 949, 952 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
Bluestone and McGahee made a similar observation in their landmark study of eighteen
prisoners on death row in 1962. Bluestone & McGahee, supra note 10, at 393. Their study
supports the hypothesis that stress from an impending death sentence causes inmates to resort
to a number of defense mechanisms, but fails to treat these reactions in detail. A study con-
ducted by Gallemore and Panton is generally consistent with this and is a bit more revealing.
They studied the effect of stress upon eight prisoners in North Carolina who had been on
death row for at least two years. Three of the eight prisoners "made relatively poor adjust-
ments, with obvious deterioration." Gallemore & Panton, supra note 10, at 529. One had "an
elevated self-mutilation score" in post-admission testing, and at one point "stuck a staple and
a broken ice cream spoon into his arm 'just to see the blood.'" Id. at 530.
Like Bluestone and McGahee, Gallemore and Panton viewed such reactions as the result
of psychological stress that caused increasingly severe reactions over time. The deterioration
noted by Gallemore and Panton appeared to be directly connected to conditions of confine-
ment on the death row:
Results of clinical evaluations and psychological testing were surprisingly uniform in
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of death row in Alabama,26 confirms and expands upon the conclusions
reached in these earlier works. Apart from how the presence of the con-
demned in prisons itself affects the conditions of that environment,
Johnson explored the affect of the sentence itself as "an independent
source of stress and suffering. ' 27 Much like Camus' initial impressions,
he describes the experience as
a painful oscillation between hope and despair. According to one prisoner:
"It's just like you are in the middle of a vise, and one part of the vise is
pulling you this way and one of them is pulling you the other way. And
the vise is sharp." With the parameters of one's existence cast in terms of
uncertain hope and uncertain despair, arduous and recurring battles for
peace of mind ensue.28
Like Gallemore and Panton, Johnson observed a marked deteriora-
tion over time. He also found that, eventually, traditional defense
mechanisms fail and prisoners consider suicide-either by their own
hands or by terminating their legal battles-as a welcome option. Thus,
soine spoke of suicide as preferable "to the marginal lives they expect to
eke out after years of confinement. '29
As long ago as 1950, a Supreme Court Justice recognized that "the
onset of insanity while awaiting execution of a death sentence is not a
rare phenomenon. '30 Johnson's study, as well as those of other com-
mentators, 3' indicate that an early symptom of psychological impair-
demonstrating a "hardening" of psychological defenses as time passed on death
row .... The potential for constructive reeducation that might follow the breakdown
of previous antisocial behavior patterns in the face of overwhelming stress is obvious. It
is also evident, however, that death row confinement has not been designed for positive
rehabilitative emphasis, and in practice the occupants over time become progressively
less suitable for reentry into a general prison population or the general public.
Id. at 532-33.
26 R. JOHNSON, supra note 10.
27 Id. at 80.
28 Id. at 81.
29 Id. at 111. Johnson went on to state:
They speak of suicide as a means of escape from death row. They also consider dropping
their appeals as a means to terminate their death row confinement, which would be
tantamount to committing state-assisted suicide. In their words, "I probably think about
suicide more than a lot of guys up there. Like I say, I want out. Where the rest of these
guys, they say, 'while you live there's hope.' Well, that's true. I'm not gonna' be so stupid
as to say it's not. But they're willing to wait five or ten years to get off death row. I'm
not. And I've made this statement on several occasions, that if something's not done
pretty soon, there's no doubt, I'll punch out. I'll punch my own ticket if I have to."
Id. at 111-12.
30 Solesbee v. Balkoom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950)(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); cf. Ex pare
Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890); People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 649, 493 P.2d 880, 894,
100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 166 (1972) ("the process of carrying out a verdict of death is often so
degrading and brutalizing to the human spirit as to constitute psychological torture"). See
generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 288 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
31 See C. DAvis,supra note 10, at 157; S. GETrINGER,supra note 10, at 94; Comment, supra
note 15, at 1342; Note, Mental Suffering Under Sentence of Death, supra note 10, at 82 7-29; Wat-
ters, Death Row.: Three Who Wait, JURIS 19 (JAN. 1977); Under New Law, Fewer People Line Death
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ment is often attempted suicide.
The lure of suicide, either by direct action or by enlisting the assist-
ance of the State, as a release from this intense psychological torture
may be as great for the innocent as for the guilty. Isidore Zimmerman
once came within a few minutes of being electrocuted. When the time
finally approached he reportedly welcomed the news and was disap-
pointed when he was reprieved. Zimmerman was later fully exonerated
for the crime for which he once "willingly" sought to be executed.3 2
2. The Message of "Death" Row
There are well over a thousand prisoners on death rows across the
country,33 with an average of one person every three days being added
to this total.34 These growing numbers are forced to cope, often for
years,35 on make-shift death rows originally designed for short-term con-
finement.36 Recent studies and law suits document both the barbaric
conditions pervading death rows and the debilitating and life-negating
effects of these conditions. According to available studies, death row
inmates are generally not integrated into the general prison population;
have no access to "rehabilitative" programs; have little opportunity to
exercise; and are confined to their cells for extraordinarily long periods
Row, The News and Observer, Raleigh, North Carolina, Apr. 17, 1979; Contact, Inc., The
Question of Capital Punishment 97 (1980 & March 1981 update).
Similar breakdowns in behavior have been noted in other contexts where death was
imminent. See E. KUBLER-Ross, ON DEATH AND DYING (1969); Pattison, The Experience of
Dying, 21 AM. J. PSYCHOLOGY 32,35 (1967) (quoted in Note,MentalS& fing Under Sentence of
Death,supra note 10, at 827).
32 S. GETIINGER, supra note 10, at 95. Gettinger also relates the story of a Florida man
who
fought his conviction for five years without success and then wrote to his attorney in 1965
to give up all appeals and arrange for his execution. "I have come to the conclusion that
I prefer to die rather than to live," he said. The lawyer did not give up, and seven years
later it was proven that the incriminating plaster molds of the man's footprints had been
made not at the scene of the crime but in the backyard of a deputy sheriff. The convic-
tion was overturned and the man went free.
Id.
33 See Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908, 909 n.7 (1982) (citing
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC., DEATH Row, U.S.A. 1 (1982).
34 Gillers, supra note 10, at 5 & n.13.
35 Even before the importance of post-conviction procedures was emphasized by the
Supreme Court, it was not uncommon for the condemned to spend years languishing on
death row. Chessman spent at least 11 years on death row in San Quentin. People v. Chess-
man, 52 Cal. 2d 467, 499, 341 P.2d 679, 699, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 925 (1959); see also Chess-
man v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1960) (11 years on death row is neither an eighth
amendment violation nor denial a of due process). Charles Townsend spent almost 16 years
on death row in Illinois. Townsend v. Twomey, 322 F. Supp. 158, 174 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
36 Historically, death row confinement was limited to months, rather than years, while
efforts at clemency and last minute appeals were exhausted. R. JOHNSON, supra note 10, at
121.
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of time.3 7
37 Two unpublished studies document nation-wide death row conditions. The first is a
compilation of the results of a questionnaire circulated by the American Foundation Institute
of Corrections in 1979. W. Nagel, Death House Survey (The American Foundation, Inc.,
Institute of Corrections, July 1, 1979). According to the study, 26 states segregate the con-
demned either in separate cell blocks or in entirely separate facilities. Moreover, privileges
afforded the prisoners in these segregated conditions appear to be arbitrarily granted or with-
held. While a few states permit almost unlimited and/or lengthy visitation, 9 states deny
contact visitation entirely and another 2 limit the duration of visits to only 30 minutes per
month. Recreation periods demonstrate a similar arbitrariness. Id. One state permits up to
56 hours of out-of-cell recreation per week while another 2 allow only 2 hours per week. Id.
As expected, inmates live under such harsh conditions for years. One individual had been
awaiting execution for 9 years and 3 months at the time of the survey. Six states reported
holding prisoners for execution for over 5 years, and 10 other states reported holding them
from 2 to 5 years. Id.
The second study, conducted through the School of Social Work at the University of
Iowa, also compiled the results of questionnaires, but is more comprehensive in its findings.
See Else, Kudsk & Meyer, supra note 10. This study confirms the indications of the earlier
study that those under sentence of death are segregated from general prison populations.
According to this study, only one state, Pennsylvania, integrates the condemned into the gen-
eral prison populations. Id. at 3. Six states require segregation by statute. Id. Most signifi-
cantly, ha/f of the reporting states confessed that no contact is permitted with other inmates at
all. Id.
The second study also reveals that "death-sentenced inmates," or DSIs, as the authors
refer to them, suffer from a wide range of disabilities not imposed upon other inmates. These
disabilities are imposed on DSIs "not because of their behavior within the institution, but
because of the sentence they received from the court." Id. at 11. The authors conclude:
Comparing the daily activities of DSIs with the general prison populations, the differ-
ences are distressing. Most DSIs cannot work at prison jobs, cannot attend education
classes, clubs or religious services, have much less opportunity for exercise and recreation
and much less adequate facilities and equipment. DSIs have little human contact. Most
are confined to their cells over 22 hours a day. Many are shackled for trips within the
prison. Most eat in their cells and are separated from visitors by barriers.
"Exercise areas" are often the hallways outside the DSI cells or "dog runs" with abso-
lutely no equipment provided. In some places no hobbies are allowed in the cells and
there is a limit of four books in the cell at any one time ...
Perhaps more important than any single deprivation is the fact that the impact and
effect of each restriction is exaggerated because of the more general deprivation of being
kept in cells most of every day and isolated from almost all contact with other human
beings.
Id. at 12.
Reports of conditions in specific states or individual prisons within a state confirm the
conclusions reached in these studies. For instance, there is more information available about
death row in Holman Prison in Alabama than about any other death row. In 1978, a class
action suit was brought by Holman inmates culminating in a settlement agreement in 1980.
Jacobs v. Bennett, No. 78-309-H (S.D. Ala., Nov. 3, 1978) (plaintiff's pretrial brief); Jacobs v.
Britton, No. 78-309-H (S.D. Ala. Jan. 1980) (settlement agreement). In addition, Professor
Johnson's work was conducted at Holman. See R. JOHNSON, supra note 10. According to the
evidence collected for the class action suit and Johnson's study, prisoners in Holman prior to
the settlement were under "locked-down" status in their cells 23 to 24 hours a day. Massive
idleness was the norm. Prisoners were kept in virtual solitary confinement. They were not
allowed to mingle with each other, and visitation privileges were minimal. Id. at 49, 54-55.
Not even television was provided on a routine basis. Id. at 48. One prisoner reportedly
passed the time by playing with cockroaches and another by reading a dictionary. Id. In
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While the sentence of death itself is a source of considerable and
often debilitating stress, the "social environment" in which the trauma
of imminent death is experienced can itself "play a critical role in deter-
mining the nature and outcome of coping efforts." 38 In contrast to the
dying patient whose "social environment" often is made life-affirming
through the intentional enhancement of personal autonomy, conditions
on death rows are designed to be life-negating. The remote physical
locations of the prisons, limited visitation rights, and the indignities
forced upon both inmate and visitor when those rights are invoked stand
in stark contrast to the support systems available to a terminally ill pa-
tient.39 Apparently abandoned by the living, the condemned are sub-
jected to "massive deprivation[s] of personal autonomy" on death row.4
The image of death row existence as itself a "living death" 41 is reflected
in the attitudes of death row inmates whose expressions of suicidal im-
addition, food was sparse and cold, often mixed with hair and bugs. Id. at 45; see Bennett, No.
78-309-H at 4.
As if the physical conditions were not brutalizing enough, allegations of random beatings
abound. Bennett, No. 78-309-H at 1 (S.D. Ala., Nov. 3, 1978) (amended complaint). Even
more torturous than the physical beatings, however, were the instances of psychological abuse
by guards:
Unquestionably, the most potent and virulent source of death anxiety is staff efforts to
remind inmates of their impending execution. Upon admission to death row, prisoners
have been given tours of the deathroom during which they view the electric chair as
though it were an exihibit in a museum. In uglier encounters, new prisoners may be
graphically reminded of their date with the chair, and then summarily locked in their
cells to consider their fate.
R. JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 83.
At the time of the Bennett lawsuit, there were 38 prisoners on Holman's death row living
under these conditions. Although only four had exhausted even their state remedies on direct
appeal, 20 had been there a year or more, including one who was there two and a half years
and another for two years. Bennett, No. 78-309-H at 2.
Similar conditions have been described, although in less detail, in Georgia, see Daniels v.
Zant, No. 79-110-MAC (M.D. Ga., July 20, 1979); C. DAVIS, supra note 10, at 1, 157-58;
Virginia, see Brown v. Hutto, No. 81-0853-R (E.D. Va., Feb. 23, 1982) (proposed consent
decree) (at one time, Frank Coppola was a named plaintiff in this class action); Oklahoma, see
S. GETINGER, supra note 10, at 68; R. JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 142 n. 1; North Carolina,
see Gallemore & Panton, supra note 10, at 528; and Florida, see S. GETrINGER, supra note 10,
at 23; Lewis, supra note 10, at 208-09.
38 R. JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 9.
39 Id. at 10. Johnson notes:
In spite of the confining hospital milieu, many terminally ill patients appear able to
adjust to their fate. They do so with the aid of family and other community-based re-
sources. The comparative flexibility that can be incorporated into hospital procedures,
giving patients a limited sense of control over their life, may also aid adjustments.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
40 Id. at 110. As a result, Johnson concludes that "a sense of helpless defeat may represent
for the death row prisoner what growth and acceptance represent for the terminal patient:
the culmination of a struggle to come to grips with the prospect of death in a particular
institutional context." Id. at 98 n.10.
41 Id. at 17. Johnson observed that many inmates themselves used the term "living
death" to characterize "the essential or cumulative experience" of death row existence--"the
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pulses or desires to waive their appeals are continually connected to
their thoughts about "living" on death row.
One inmate in California stated: "I would rather go downstairs to
that gas chamber then have to spend the rest of my life here. Being free
is being alive. If a person goes down to the gas chamber he's escaped. It
is going to cost him his life, but he's escaped. '42 Such sentiments com-
monly result in suicide attempts. At Mecklenburg, experts observed an
unusually high incidence of self-mutilation and other psychological
problems among inmates.43 Similar observations have been made in
Florida, 44 Oklahoma 45 and Auschwitz. 46
zombie-like, mechanical existence of an isolate physical organism-a fragile twilight creature
that emerges when men are systematically denied their humanity." Id.
42 S. GETTINGER, supra note 10, at 96.
43 Memorandum in Support of Application for Stay of Execution, Lawrence v. Mitchell,
No. 82-6495 at 8-9 (4th Cir., Aug. 10, 1982). Another expert added that the "enforced social
isolation" present at Mecklenburg produced, first, "loneliness, giving way to depression, and
culminating in some cases, in suicidal thoughts and gestures." Id.
44 Lewis reports that approximately 42 percent of the death row inmates in Florida seri-
ously considered suicide at one point or another, and 35 percent actually attempted suicide.
Lewis, supra note 10, at 217 (quoting P. LEwis & K. PEOPLES, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE CRIMINAL PROCESS: CASES AND COMMENTS 1164-72 (1978)).
45 Gettinger noted that Richard Hager demanded to be executed after spending only
three months on Oklahoma's death row. S. GETrINGER, supra note 10, at 67-68.
46 See general'y G. KREN & L. RAPPAPORT, THE HOLOCAUST AND THE CRISIS OF HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 115 (1980) ("[s]uicide was not infrequent [in the death camps]"); B. BETTELHEIM,
Individual and Mass Behavior, reprinted in B. BETTELHEIM, SURVIVING AND OTHER ESSAYS 69,
308 (1979) [hereinafter Bettelheim, Individual and Mass Behavior]; Citrome, Conclusions dune En-
quete sur le Suicide dans les Camps de Concentration, 12 CAHIERS INTERNATIONNAUXDE SOClO-
LOGIE 147 (1952).
In the extermination camps of Nazi Germany, prisoners were repressed into "docility" to
the point where they "walked to the gas chambers or. . . dug their own graves and then
lined up before them so that, shot down, they would fall into the graves." B. BETrLEHEIM,
THE INFORMED HEART 250 (1960). Bettelheim describes how conditions in the camps them-
selves coerced suicidal actions by prisoners:
It may be assumed that most of these prisoners were by then suicidal. Walking to the gas
chamber was committing suicide in a way that asked for none of the energy usually
needed for deciding and planning to kill oneself. Psychologically speaking, most prison-
ers in the extermination camps committed suicide by submitting to death without resist-
ance. . . . Through the use of terror the SS succeeded in forcing its opponents to do, out
of their own will, what it wished them to do. Millions of people submitted to extermina-
tion because SS methods had forced them to see it not as a way out, but as the only way
to put an end to conditions in which they could no longer live as human beings. . . .Id.
at 250-51. What happened in the concentration camp suggests that under conditions of
extreme deprivation, the influence of the environment over the individual can become
total.
Id. 147.
Bettelheim also observes that the environment made fulfillment of the death wish simple
since one only had to give up:
It came relatively rarely through outright suicide, because this meant to take some ac-
tion, desperate as it was, and they no longer had the strength to act on their own. But
there was also no need to deliberately do away with one's life. If one did not exercise
great ingenuity and determination in the battle to stay alive, one was soon dead, given
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In finding confinement conditions unconstitutional, courts often as-
sociate incidents of suicide and self-mutilation with the dehumanizing
and life-negating environments. For example, in Ramos v. Lamm 47 the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that incarceration in
"Old Max," Colorado's maximum security prison, violated the eighth
amendment. Evidence at trial indicated that a combination of factors,
including low staffing levels, the architecture of the cellhouses, the phys-
ical layout of the buildings themselves and the depraved conditions
maintained within the cellhouses contributed to high levels of vio-
lence.48 In particular, self-inflicted forms of violence existed at an unusu-
ally intense level. 49
In a sense, the condemned have at their disposal an "easier" way to
find release from unbearable conditions: they can simply "pull the plug"
by firing their attorneys and withdrawing their appeals. Robert Lee
Massie, for example, attempted to dismiss his automatic appeal from a
first degree murder conviction in California in 1979 primarily because
he preferred execution to the extended torture of life on San Quentin's
death row.50 He had previously been confined for seven and a half years
the conditions in the camps. Therefore if one gave up hope, one lost the ability to go on
with the difficult and painful struggle survival required and so one died in a short time.
B. BErrELHEIM, Individual and Mass Behavior, supra, at 106.
47 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981).
48 Id. at 573. It has long been recognized that pervasive idleness and in-cell confinement
causes increased tension and violence. See, e.g., Burks v. Teasdale, 603 F.2d 59, 63 (8th Cir.
1979); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 968-69 (D.R.I. 1977); Anderson v. Redman,
429 F. Supp. 1105, 1113 (D. Del. 1977); see also Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 294
(D.N.H. 1977); Jordon v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 680 (N.D. Cal. 1966); Comment, Con-
fronting the Conditions of Confinement: An Expanded Role for Courts in Prison Reform, 12 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 367, 400 (1977).
49 Ramos, 639 F.2d at 572. The District Court presented these findings in greater detail:
"In 1978, the Department reported more than 70 incidents of suicide and self-mutilation
attempts. Between January 1, 1979 and May 30, 1979, the Department reported more than
21 incidents." 485 F. Supp. 122, 144 (D. Colo. 1979). Indeed, the Colorado Department of
Corrections' own Five Year Plan supported these findings:
Frequently, because of the low level of individual attention devoted to this type of in-
mate and because of the high level of sensory deprivation that results from housing in a
total isolation environment, he or she will seek any path available to compensate. Self-
inflicted wounds and ingestion of metal, glass, or other foreign objects are frequent exam-
ples of these attention-seeking measures. Many, if not all of these incidents could be
avoided by placing these inmates in a professionally administered unit that does not
entail the almost total sensory deprivation of Cellhouse 3.
Brief for Appellee at 66-67, Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1041 (1981) (quoting Five Year Plan). Experts also supported these findings. See id. at
66 (worse than the physical violence was "the kind of violence which emerges because men
are largely idle, tense, angry and deteriorating, and forced to remain that way"); see also Ander-
son, 429 F. Supp. at 1112-18 (overcrowding caused severe physical and psychological damage
to inmates, including increased incidence of self-mutilation and attempted suicide).
50 Massie v. Sumner, 624 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1103 (1981). Massie
was sentenced to die on May 25, 1979. Just a few months later, a class action law suit was
filed by San Quentin's death row inmates, contesting automatic segregation, strip searches,
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on death row under a prior murder conviction. 51 Massie stated that he
did not want to be executed, nor did he object to spending the rest of his
life incarcerated. Given, however, the "choice" of execution or life on
death row, he preferred execution.5 2 Indeed, Massie based his claim
that he had a right to be executed in part on the eighth amendment,
bizarrely asserting that execution was an appropriate "remedy" for this
violation. 53
Most inmates are not as articulate as Massie in expressing the ra-
tionale for their decision to assist the executioner. Frank Coppola sim-
ply demanded his execution, but experts reporting on conditions at
Mecklenburg in support of his attorneys' efforts to stay his execution
stated that his decision
may be viewed as the product of the intolerable conditions of confinement
that he is subjected to and the resultant loneliness, depression, frustration,
helplessness and hopelessness. I doubt that Mr. Coppola would have made
the decision to forego the legal process if the conditions at MCC were less
restrictive and demeaning and more dignifying and humane than they
are.
54
Most of the other reported instances of attempts to waive trial or post-
conviction remedies have been based, at least in part, on the anticipa-
tion or experience of incarceration on death row.55
poor ventilation, lighting and general conditions, and lack of contact visits, vocational or
educational programs. Thompson v. Enomoto, C-79-1630-ACW (N.D. Cal., July 6, 1979).
51 See Massie, 624 F.2d at 73 n.1.
52 Id. at 73; see also S. GETTINGER, supra note 10, at 95 (quoting Capote, Death Row,
US.A., Esquire (Oct. 1968) (Massie demanded to be executed)); CONTACT, INC., supra note
31, at 97 (quoting Massie: "Why should the law be permitted to play with my life like a yo-
yo subjecting me to continuous dates of execution?").
53 Massie, 624 F.2d at 73. The court rejected this claim, holding that Massie had other
remedies, such as a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976). Id. As this Article argues in the
following section, Massie's argument turned the law on its head: the eighth amendment vio-
lation should haveprecluded the court from finding his "choice" a voluntary one.
54 Lawrence v. Mitchell, No. 82-6495 (4th Cir., Aug. 10, 1982) (Memorandum in Support
of Application for Stay of Execution) (quoting Milan affidavit).
On January 17, 1983, another Mecklenburg death row inmate, thirty-year-old Buddy
Earl Justus (who is also sentenced to die in Georgia and Florida) wrote a petition to the local
court asking that his execution be "conducted as soon as possible." Washington Post, Feb. 3,
1983, at B6, col. 2-3. Justus had been convicted first in 1979, had his conviction reversed on
appeal, but was retried and convicted again in 1980. According to Justus' attorneys, Justus
sought execution because of the deplorable conditions at Mecklenburg. Id. He changed his
mind, however, on February 2, 1983.
55 Prison conditions appear to have played a part in both Gary Gilmore's and Jesse
Bishop's "decisions" to seek execution. Gilmore's famous demand to die "with grace and
dignity" itself implies that the prison environment in which he had spent most of his life
overcame his will to live. H. BEDAU, supra note 19, at 122; see also Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S.
1012, 1015 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (noting that Gilmore stated "he did not 'care to lan-
guish in prison for another day,' " but disclaiming that his decision was the product of the
"the way he was treated in prison"). Bishop "complained bitterly" about conditions on Ne-
vada's death row. Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 811 n.2 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting
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Thus, decisions to plead guilty or waive post-conviction remedies
in capital cases are generally not the product of rational and autono-
mous choice. Rather, such decisions reflect either the intentional death
wish of the condemned, as in the "murder/suicide" phenomenon, or the
synergistic effect of the panic attendant to the anticipation of death by
execution accompanied by continued existence in the insufferable envi-
rons of death row.56 The "choice" offered by the State is not an easy
one, and prisoners often attempt to retract their "waivers" once made.57
from denial of stay); see a/so Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 607-08 (1982) (quoting Evans
telling the jury "'I would rather die by electrocution than spend the rest of my life in the
penitentiary'"); Evans v. State, 361 So. 2d 654, 655 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977); People v.
Chadd, 28 Cal. 3d 739, 744-45, 621 P.2d 837, 840, 170 Cal. Rptr. 798, 801 (1981) (considered
death penalty "for all intents better for me" after having "given serious consideration to the
consequences of the trial, the outcome, what it might be"); People v. Stanworth, 71 Cal. 2d
820, 830 nn.12-13, 457 P.2d 889, 896 nn.12-13, 80 Cal. Rptr. 49, 56 nn.12-13 (1969) (desiring
execution since "'it would save me many months of useless existence here on Death Row'"
and because he wished to "'suffer for my acts'" and he "'cannot continue living with [a]
cloud over my head, please be merciful and give me an endless sleep as soon as you can so this
pain and suffering that I have will be no more' "); Goode v. State, 365 So. 2d 381, 382 (Fla.
1979) (one of Goode's three reasons for desiring execution was that he "wish[ed] not to spend
the rest of his life in prison"); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 383 A.2d 174, 181
(1978) (McKenna "personally prefers death to spending the remainder of his life in prison");
Ritter, Waiting to Die in Alabama, SOUTHERN COALITION REPORT ON JAILS & PRISONS 4, 6
(1979); Andersen, The Death Penalty, Time, Jan. 24, 1983, at 32 (Doris Ann Foster described
her attempt to fire her Maryland attorneys and, despite maintaining her innocence, actively
seek her execution, because, she said, death row was" 'ruining my body and eventually would
ruin my mind. I could see what I'd be like after ten years here. I don't want to be hostile. I
don't want to lose my peace. I have no desire to continue on in such an inhumane
existence.'").
56 A third possible reason that appears to be present in at least two known cases is best
described as the "blaze of glory" syndrome. Gary Gilmore's decision to seek execution by
firing squad has been criticized, for example, as simply another manifestation of his "un-
repentant and callous self-centered attitude toward human life" which ultimately included
his own. H. BEDAU, supra note 19, at 122-23. Before he changed his mind, John Louis Evans
exhibited a similar bravado. See Evans, 361 So. 2d at 656, 661. Assuming that such exhibi-
tionist tendencies are not themselves symptoms of an underlying psychological defect, but see
United States v. Robertson, 507 F.2d 1148, 1153 & n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1974), it is questionable
whether the rationales summoned in defense of the death penalty are furthered by the State's
becoming an accomplice to the fulfillment of such motivations. See infla Part IV.
57 See, e.g., Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 608; Evans v. Bennett, 440 U.S. 987 (1979)
(Brennan, J., concurring in denial of stay); Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306, 1307 n.* (1979)
(Rehnquist, Circuit Justice); People v. Stanworth, 11 Cal. 3d 588, 608, 522 P.2d 1058, 1072,
114 Cal. Rptr. 250, 264 (1974) (Stanworth claiming his counsel was ineffective for allowing
him to plead guilty in accordance with his own wishes); see also Potts v. Zant, 638 F.2d 727
(5th Cir. 1981); Evans v. Britton, 628 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1980),petitionfor reh'g denied, 639 F.2d
221 (5th Cir. 1981); W. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 386-94 (1974) (complete inven-
tory of executions in Virginia); R. JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 145 n.24 (discussing letter from
inmate expressing desire for death, and his attorney's ability to change his mind by showing
his concern). This tendency for change of heart is perhaps explained by former Pennsylvania
Supreme Court Justice Musmanno:
One of the judges of the lower court indicated from the bench that a sentence of life
imprisonment is not to be regarded as a lesser penalty than that of death. I challenge
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III. THE AUTONOMY OF THE DEATH DECISION: AN EXERCISE OF
FREE WILL OR A COERCED RESPONSE TO STRESS?
A. COMPETENCY
To date, challenges to a capital defendant's "right" to demand his
own execution have been almost exclusively limited to the question of
competency, and have not deviated markedly from the analysis first ar-
ticulated in Rees v. Peon.58 In Rees, the Court established that, as a
matter of due process, a condemned prisoner cannot be permitted to re-
fuse the assistance of counsel and terminate legal proceedings without
an adequate hearing to determine his ability to make such a choice ra-
tionally. The Court instructed the trial court to make a finding with
respect to Rees' competence to abandon further post-conviction attacks
on his sentence, using the following standard:
[We] direct the District Court to determine Rees' mental competence in
the present posture of things, that is, whether he has capacity to appreciate
his position and make a rationale choice with respect to continuing or
abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he is suffering
from mental disease, disorder or defect which may substantially affect his
capacity in the premises. 5 9
This analysis is inadequate, however, to protect either the individual's
or the State's interests in administering the death penalty. It fails to
address the requirement that the standard for determining competency
is a varying one that depends upon the rights sought to be waived; it
fails to reflect the uniqueness of the decision involved in the death pen-
alty context; and it fails to address the "suicide" or "murder/suicide"
phenomena so often present in instances of attempted waivers.
Cases concerning this standard tend to address the nature of the
hearing and the sufficiency of the evidence rather than the standard
that statement categorically. It can be stated as a universal truth stretching from nadir
to zenith that regardless of circumstances, no one wants to die. Some person may, in an
instant of spiritual or physical agony express a desire for death as an anodyne from intol-
erable pain, but that desire is never full-hearted because there is always the reserve of
realization that the silken cord of life is not broken by a mere wishing. There is no
person in the actual extremity of dropping from the precipice of life who does not desper-
ately reach for a crag of time to which to cling even for a moment against the awful
eternity of silence below. With all its "slings and arrows of outrageous fortune," life is
yet sweet and death is always cruel.
Commonwealth v. Elliott, 371 Pa. 70, 79-80, 89 A.2d 782, 787 (1952) (Musmanno, J., dis-
senting).
58 384 U.S. 312 (1966) (per curiam). See generally Note, The Death Row Right to Die, supra
note 10; Note, supra note 7. Examples of such challenges include: Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S.
1306 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice) (granting temporary stay), 444 U.S. 807 (1979) (vacating
temporary stay); Evans v. Bennett, 440 U.S. 1301 (granting temporary stay), 440 U.S. 987
(vacating temporary stay) (1979); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976); see also Hays v.
Murphy, 663 F.2d 1004, 1008-09 (10th Cir. 1981); Beavans v. Maggio, No. 81-3668 (5th Cir.,
Nov. 2, 1981).
59 Rees, 384 U.S. at 314.
[Vol. 74
1983] VOLUNTEERING FOR EXECUTION
itself. The most comprehensive analysis is in the Tenth Circuit's recent
decision, Hays v. Murphy. 60 Thomas Lee Hays was convicted of first de-
gree murder at a trial in which he contested his guilt. While he cooper-
ated in his direct appeal, he thereafter opposed all further actions on his
behalf.6 ' His mother initiated the federal habeas proceedings culminat-
ing in the Tenth Circuit's decision.62
All parties agreed that the Rees standard was sufficient. The battle-
ground of the case concerned the question of whether the district court
had sufficient information upon which to base its finding of competency.
Hays had a history of mental problems, including commitment periods,
"suicidal tendencies," alcoholism, and the possibility of a concussion. 63
At least under these or similar circumstances, the Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that due process required "extended, close observation in a
proper setting which is generally recognized as essential for the psychiat-
ric and psychological evaluations required. '64 Thus, Hays stands for the
proposition that, while psychiatric or psychological examinations and
60 663 F.2d 1004 (10th Cir. 1981).
61 Id. at 1006-07.
62 Id. The mother was proceeding as a "next friend" under settled principles. See generally
in/a notes 209-15 and accompanying text. 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1971) specifically provides for
such third party petitions under appropriate circumstances: "Application for a writ of habeas
corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by
someone acting in his behalf. Id. (emphasis added).
63 Id. at 1009.
64 Id. at 1011-12 (footnotes omitted). The court emphasized that the "proper setting" did
not include death row:
We are convinced that the evidence overwhelmingly establishes that there was not
sufficient opportunity for proper psychiatric and psychological evaluation of Mr. Hays.
There was sporadic interviewing of him through the long period that he has been in
custody on death row at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary and several psychiatrists have
had contacts with him at different times.
Nevertheless, the testimony convincingly demonstrates thatproper evaluation requires a
setting and a relationship between the subject and the experts which were not permitted by the circum-
stances of death row imprisonment. This is illustrated by the fact that the State relies heavily
on the one 30-minute interview of Hays on death row by four staff members, and then
consensus opinion therefrom. This, we conclude, was clearly inadequate to serve as a
basis for such a serious determination.
Id. at 1011 (emphasis added). The court also criticized the lack of psychological testing and
the attempt to substitute expert testimony for actual examination of the inmate. Id. at 1012-
13; see also Rees, 384 U.S. at 314 (appropriate to place Rees, a state prisoner, in temporary
federal hospitalization to accomplish the necessary psychiatric and medical examinations).
The court in Hays distinguished the less stringent procedures required in Lenhard, Evans, and
Gilmore on the ground that "[i]n these cases there was less evidence indicating incompetence
than in the case before us." 663 F.2d at 1013 n.17. Gilmore was found competent on the
basis of a one-hour interview conducted by a court-appointed prison psychiatrist with corrob-
oration by two prison psychologists. See Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. at 1310-11. Bishop was
found competent to plead guilty after being examined by three psychiatrists. No other judi-
cial determination of his competency occurred. One psychiatrist, however, submitted a re-
port after a four-hour interview, concluding that Bishop was competent to waive further
proceedings. Id. at 1311. See generally, Annot., 37 A.L.R. Fed. 356 (1978).
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evaluations are the sine qua non of an adequate inquiry into competency,
the hearing may still be inadequate if the professional evaluations or
examinations are not conducted and administered in a proper manner.
Yet, however welcome the development of increased procedural require-
ments to implement the Rees standard may be, the defective substantive
standard remains intact.
The standard articulated in Rees is substantively equivalent to the
standard used to determine competence to stand trial: the "sufficient
present ability to consult with [one's] lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding [and have] a rational as well as factual under-
standing of the proceedings against him."' 65 This standard is inadequate
to satisfy the strict procedural protection required for a death sentence
to be constitutionally executed.
In Westbrook v. Arizona 66 the Supreme Court, in a brief per curiam
opinion, reversed a first degree murder conviction where the death pen-
alty was imposed because the lower court failed to make an independent
determination that the accused, though competent to stand trial, was
also competent to conduct his own defense and thus able to voluntarily
and intelligently waive his right to counsel. While courts do not agree in
their interpretations of Westbrook, a number of courts construe the case
to require a greater showing of competency where constitutional rights
are involved. The leading articulation of this argument is that of the
Ninth Circuit Sieing v. Eyman, which adopted an earlier dissenting
opinion:
Judge Hufstedler, in Schoeller v. Dunbar, 423 F.2d 1183, 1194 (9th Cir.
1970), has suggested the following standard: "A defendant is not compe-
tent to plead guilty if a mental illness has substantially impaired his ability
to make a reasoned choice among the alternatives presented to him and to
understand the nature of the consequences of his plea." We think this
formulation is the appropriate one, for it requires a court to assess a de-
fendant's competency with specific reference to the gravity of the decisions
with which the defendant is faced. 67
To waive a constitutional right, then, an individual must have that
65 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam); see also United States v.
Dunn, 594 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 852 (1979).
66 384 U.S. 150 (1966) (per curiam).
67 478 F.2d 211, 215 (9th Cir. 1973);accord Chavez v. United States, 656 F.2d 512 (9th Cir.
1981); United States v. David, 511 F.2d 355 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (competence to stand trial alone
does not establish competence to waive a jury trial); People v. Vanderwerff, 57 Ill. App. 3d 44,
49-50, 372 N.E.2d 1014, 1019 (1978); State v. Walton, 228 N.W.2d 21, 24 (Iowa 1975); cf.
State v. Likakur, 26 Wash. App. 297, 302, 613 P.2d 156, 159 (1980) ("[w]e believe that the
various constitutional rights of the accused are accorded different procedural safeguards de-
pending on the nature of the right itself and the circumstances of each case"). Many courts,
however, reject this distinction, holding that a determination of competency to stand trial is
sufficient for other purposes. See, e.g., United States ex rel Heral v. Franzen, 667 F.2d 633,
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degree of competence required to make decisions of very serious import.
The precise degree of competence must ultimately focus upon the conse-
quences that are likely to flow from the decision in question. In the.
death penalty context the consequences are sui generic. As the Supreme
Court has repeatedly recognized in requiring enhanced due process pro-
tections of other kinds in this area, the death penalty is unique in its
finality.68 Accordingly, an appropriate standard should be able to de-
tect those ""who, because of mental illness, would be likel to make decisions about
their own interests which would result in substantial damage to their mental or
physical well-being."'69
637-38 (7th Cir. 1981); Bolius v. Wainwright, 597 F.2d 986, 988 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979); Allard v.
Helgemoe, 572 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 858 (1978).
In other contexts, however, many of the courts that claim to reject the Sieling approach
in fact vary the competency standard depending upon the issue involved. In Rennie v. Klein,
462 F. Supp. 1131, 1147 (D.N.J. 1978), modiftd and remanded on other grounds, 653 F.2d 836 (3d
Cir. 1981), for example, the court upheld the right of an involuntarily committed mental
patient to refuse treatment in non-emergency situations. While the patient is incompetent for
most purposes, the court held that the factfinder must nevertheless determine the extent to
which the specific act of refusing treatment was based on the underlying mental illness, stat-
ing that "[t]he greater the lack of insight [into the severity of the problem by the patient], the
stronger the impetus to override the right to individual autonomy." 462 F. Supp. at 1146; see
also State v. Severns, 184 Kan. 213, 219, 336 P.2d 447, 452 (1959) (for purposes of trial,
defendant may be "sane" but may be "deranged" as to other matters); Guardianship of Bas-
sett, 385 N.E.2d 1024, 1028 (Mass. App. 1979) (affirming trial court's finding that Bassett, a
"moderately" retarded person, was "competent to handle "some but not all of his personal and
financial matters' "); Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. 1978). As Ulett
explains:
In deciding competency, one should consider. . . whether competency for only a specific
act is to be judged (e.g., executing a will or some particular business transaction). It is
important that the psychiatrist not consider competence generally but understand that
the question is, instead, 'competence for what particular purpose.' Therefore, his mental
status examination should be tailored to throw light upon the specific question.
G. ULETT, A SYNOPSIS OF CONTEMPORARY PSYCHIATRY 337-38 (5th ed. 1972) quotedin Sha-
piro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Control Autonomy and the Coercive Ue of Organic Therapies,
47 S. CAL. L. REv. 237, 308 n.249 (1974); cf. Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert.denied, 404 U.S. 815 (1971); Note, Infomed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632,
1652-53 (1974) [hereinafter Note, Informed Consent]; Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentaly Ill:
Theories and Procedures , 79 HARV. L. REv. 1288, 1295 (1966) [hereinafter Note, Civil Commitment
of the Mentaly Ill].
68 See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117-18 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272
(1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-
58 (1977) (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J.); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305
(1976) (plurality opinion) (Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.); id. at 322-23 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187; Furman, 408 U.S. at 286-91 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at
345-46 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); see Evans, 440 U.S. at
1306 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice) (irrevocability compels granting of stay request), 440 U.S.
987 (temporary stay vacated). See generall Note, A Matter of Lzfe and Death." Due Process Protec-
tion in Capital Clemeny Proceedings, 90 YALE L.J. 889, 902-03 (1981); Radin, supra note 9.
69 Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, supra note 67, at 1295 (whether persons should
be deprived of power to make decisions about their own commitment) (emphasis added). A
similar standard has been proposed in the context of mental patients' ability to "consent" to
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Even this standard is inadequate, however, where the right in-
volved is one of public, as well as private, importance. For example, a
defendant competent enough to stand trial does not necessarily have the
right to waive an insanity defense at trial. 70
The power of society to punish an insane person is an issue that
goes to the "very foundations of our criminal law."7 1 There is a para-
mount societal interest in ensuring that criminal laws punish only the
blameworthy. Accordingly, the risk of error in punishing a possibly in-
sane defendant is viewed as qualitatively different from the risk of error
inherent in acknowledging the competency of waivers of constitutional,
and essentially procedural, rights a defendant may exercise at trial. 72
danger and irrevocable organic therapies. See Shapiro, supra note 67, at 310; Note, Civil Com-
mitment of the Mentally Ill, supra note 67, at 1295.
70 In Whalem v. United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia held that "when there is sufficient question as to a defendant's mental responsibility at the
time of the crime, that issue must become part of the case. . . .[I]n the pursuit of justice, a
trial judge must have the discretion to impose an unwanted defense on a defendant .. "
346 F.2d 812, 818-19 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862 (1965). On three occa-
sions the court has affirmed the injection of the defense into a case over the objection of the
accused. See United States v. Wright, 627 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v.
Wright, 511 F.2d 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Ashe, 478 F.2d 661 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Few other courts have considered the issue, but most have acknowledged the discretion to
impose the insanity defense in appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Fernald, 248 A.2d
754, 761 (Me. 1968); Walker v. State, 21 Md. App. 666, 671, 321 A.2d 170, 174 (1974); State
v. Pautz, 299 Minn. 113, 117, 217 N.W.2d 190, 192 (1974); State v. Smith, 88 Wash. 2d 639,
642-43, 564 P.2d 1154, 1156 (1977) (en bane); cf. Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364
(D.C. App. 1979) (modifying Whalem); List v. State, 18 Md. App. 578, 585-87, 308 A.2d 451,
455-56 (1973), vacated on other grounds, 271 Md. 367, 316 A.2d 824 (1974); State v. Hermann,
283 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Mo. 1955) (dictum). But see People v. Gauze, 15 Cal. 3d 709, 717-18,
542 P.2d 1365, 1370, 125 Cal. Rptr. 773, 778 (1975)(en bane); Boyd v. People, 108 Colo. 289,
293-94, 116 P.2d 193, 194-95 (1941); White v. State, 17 Md. App. 58, 61-64, 299 A.2d 873, 875
(1973); People v. Gonzales, 20 N.Y.2d 289, 294-95, 229 N.E.2d 220, 223, 282 N.Y.S.2d 538,
542-43 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 971 (1968).
71 Wright, 627 F.2d at 1310.
72 As the Whalem court explained:
One of the major foundations for the structure of the criminal law is the concept of
responsibility, and the law is clear that one whose acts would otherwise be criminal has
committed no crime at all if because of incapacity due to age or mental condition he is
not responsible for those acts. If he does not know what he is doing or cannot control his
conduct or his acts are the product of a mental disease or defect, he is morally blameless
and not criminally responsible. The judgment of society and the law in this respect is
tested in any given case by an inquiry into the sanity of the accused. In other words, the
legal definition of insanity in a criminal case is a codification of the moral judgment of
society as respects a man's criminal responsibility; and if a man is insane in the eyes of
the law, he is blameless in the eyes of society and is not subject to punishment in the
criminal courts.
346 F.2d at 818; see also United States v. Wright, 627 F.2d at 1310.
The emphasis on society's obligation to withhold punishment from someone not blame-
worthy distinguishes the power of a defendant to waive the insanity defense from the right of
a defendant to plead guilty while maintaining his innocence, North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25 (1970), and the right of a defendant to conduct his own defense without appointed
counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). The decision to plead guilty discussed in
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Thus, the defendant's opposition to raising the insanity defense,
though relevant, is only the first factor to consider. 73 The court must
also weigh (1) the quality of the defendant's reasoning; (2) "the quality
of the evidence supporting the defense;" (3) "the reasonableness of the
defendant's decision to raise the defense;" and (4) "the Court's personal
observations of the defendant. ' 74
At the very least, 75 a similar balancing test should be incorporated
into the competency standard applied to waivers of challenges to the
death penalty. While on its face the death penalty is merely a form of
punishment chosen by society rather than an allocation of blame, that
distinction is blurred under contemporary Supreme Court analysis. To
be constitutional, a death penalty must be imposed in a rational and
consistent manner 76 and only in cases where such an extraordinary pun-
ishment is proportional to the circumstances and severity of the crime. 77
These requirements reflect the view that society's power to exact the
A/ford presupposes the ability of the defendant to exercise free will. Wright, 627 F.2d at 1310.
Moreover, A/ford only protects the defendant's right to enter the plea, but does not guarantee
or demand that the court accept it. In A/ford, the court stated: "Our holding does not mean
that a trial judge must accept every constitutionally valid guilty plea merely because [the]
defendant wishes to so plead. A criminal defendant does not have an absolute right under the
Constitution to have his guilty plea accepted by the Court." 400 U.S. at 38 n.ll; see also
Wright, 627 F.2d at 1310. And Faretta did not purport to work radical changes upon the
processes of criminal justice. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46 (right of self-representation not a
"license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law");see also Wright,
627 F.2d at 1310 ("[n]o defendant, whether actingpro se or through counsel, can restrain the
court from considering whether the insanity defense should be raised"); id. at 1310 n. 76. In-
deed, courts interpreting Faretta have limited its scope to its factual setting. See United States
v. Wilhelm, 570 F.2d 461, 464-66 (3d Cir. 1978) (sixth amendment does not entitle accused to
representation by nonlawyer); United States v. Cyphers, 556 F.2d 630, 634 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 972 (1977) (sixth amendment does not guarantee a defendant represented by
counsel the right to participate in trial as co-counsel); United States v. Hill, 526 F.2d 1019,
1024 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 940 (1976); cf. Fredak, 408 A.2d at 376 n.19
("[I]ower courts have been careful to construe Faretta to grant nothing more than a right to
self-representation"); Clyburn v. United States, 381 A.2d 260, 263 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 999 (1978) (Faretla does not overrule Whalem) (dictum). It is difficult, how-
ever, to perceive why society's preemptive concern with the issue of criminal responsibility
would not also be triggered in the guilty plea context. Why should an insane, but legally
"competent" defendant be allowed to plead guilty but not be allowed to waive an insanity
defense at trial? Both appear to rock the "very foundations of our criminal law." See Wright,
627 F.2d at 1310.
73 See Wright, 627 F.2d at 1311; Cross v. United States, 389 F.2d 957, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
United States v. Robertson, 430 F. Supp. 444, 446 (D.D.C. 1977).
74 Wright, 627 F.2d at 1311 (quoting United States v. Robertson, 430 F. Supp. 444, 446
(D.D.C. 1977)); see also United States v. Simms, 463 F.2d 1273, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
75 Indeed, as this Article argues in Section IV, in/ra, a much more comprehensive balanc-
ing test must be engaged in to determine the validity of such waivers in the death penalty
context.
76 See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07.
77 Furman, 408 U.S. at 286-91 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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death penalty is at least as fundamental a concern as society's power to
allocate blame itself. The risk of error in both circumstances goes to the
"very foundations of our criminal law."78T
Because imposition of the death penalty is imbued with the public
interest, unlike many constitutional rights which are deemed personal to
the individual defendant (and thus waivable), many state courts have
held that a capital defendant cannot waive challenges to his death sen-
tence. The leading case is the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in
Commonwealth v. McKenna, where the court held:
We recognize, of course, that the doctrine of waiver is, in our adversary
system of litigation, indispensable to the orderly functioning of the judicial
process. There are, however, occasional rare situations where an appellate
court must consider the interests of society as a whole in seeing to it that
justice is done, regardless of what might otherwise be the normal proce-
dure. One such situation is surely the imposition of capital punish-
ment. . . . The doctrine of waiver developed not only out of a sense of
fairness to an opposing party but also as a means of promoting jurispru-
dential efficiency by avoiding appellate court determinations of issues
which the appealing party had failed to preserve. It was not, however,
designed to block giving effect to a strong public interest, which itself is a
jurisprudential concern. It is evident from the record that Gerard Mc-
Kenna personally prefers death to spending the remainder of his life in
prison. While this may be a genuine conviction on his part, the waiver
concept was never intended as a means of allowing a criminal defendant to
choose his own sentence. Especially is this so where, as here, to do so
would result in state aided suicide. The waiver rule cannot be exalted to a
position so lofty as to require this Court to blind itself to the real issue-the
propriety of allowing the state to conduct an illegal execution of a
citizen. 79
Other courts have followed McKenna's lead and refused to accept a capi-
tal defendant's attempted waiver of post-trial remedies, 80 especially
78 Wright, 672 F.2d at 1310. The similarity in the importance of the insanity determina-
tion and the determination that death is the appropriate punishment is also reflected in the
fact that the respective proceedings are usually bifurcated from the proceedings to determine
"guilt." Compare Gregg, 428 U.S. at 191-92 ("a bifurcated system is more likely to ensure
elimination of the constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman") with United States v. Rob-
ertson, 507 F.2d 1148, 1160 n.51 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting that the court "has repeatedly
recognized the value of the bifurcated procedure" to determine insanity).
79 476 Pa. 428, 439-41, 383 A.2d 174, 180-81 (1978). In his concurrence, Judge Nix took
the view that the issue did not truly involve waiver at all but instead thepower ofthe trial court
to sentence McKenna under an unconstitutional statute. Id. at 182 (Nix, J., concurring) ("the
essense of this controversy reaches the propriety of this Court's acquiescence in an obvious
excess of sentencing power of one of its inferior tribunals, because it is the wish of the
offender").
80 Moreover, courts usually do not hold capital defendants to strict contemporaneous ob-
jection rules in reviewing errors that are claimed on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Ceja, 115 Ariz.
413, 565 P.2d 1274, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 975 (1977); State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 411, 631
P.2d 187, 193 (1981); State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 551 P.2d 1344, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 842
(1976); State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 486 P.2d 260 (1971); State v. Martin, 243 Iowa 1323,
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where there are indications that the condemned seeks "state aided sui-
cide" or where there are other indications of mental illness, though not
necessarily rising to the level of incompetency.8 1
Moreover, in other contexts where a constitutional right is deemed
to have a public, as well as personal, aspect, the Supreme Court has not
hesitated to acknowledge limitations on the power of the individual citi-
55 N.W.2d 258 (1952); Tuggle v. State, 73 Okla. Cr. 208, 211-12, 119 P.2d 857, 859 (1941);
State v. Taylor, 213 S.C. 330, 331, 49 S.E.2d 289, 289 (1948), overruled on other grounds sub nom.
State v.Jones, 268 S.C. 227, 231-32, 233 S.E.2d 287, 289 (1977); State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261,
265 (Utah 1980); State v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 2d 230, 235-36, 282 P.2d 323, 327 (1955); State v.
Russell, 106 Utah 116, 124, 145 P.2d 1003, 1007 (1944).
81 See, e.g., People v. Teron, 23 Cal. 3d 103, 588 P.2d 773, 151 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1979); State
v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187 (1981). Although these cases involve mandatory
appellate procedures, the mandatory nature of the proceeding is of no theoretical significance.
Even if these states did not require an automatic appeal, an appeal would be necessary for the
sentence to comply with constitutional standards. See infia Section IV. The states' designa-
tion of these appellate procedures as "automatic" is thus largely superfluous. Moreover, at
least one court has held that the State's "dominant and overriding interest in ensuring that
the death penalty is imposed only for [the] utmost of compelling legal reasons" was sufficient
to grant discretionary review beyond the automatic stage over the objection of the con-
demned men. See Evans v. State, 361 So. 2d 666, 667 (Ala. 1978) (per curiam); cf. Note, The
Death Row Right to Die, supra note 10, at 583 (criticizing Evans).
On similar reasoning, the California Supreme Court more recently reversed the capital
sentence in People v. Chadd, 28 Cal. 3d 739, 621 P.2d 837, 170 Cal. Rptr. 798 (en banc), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 931 (1981). Faced with charges of capital murder in Nevada as well as Cali-
fornia, id. at 745 n.2, 621 P.2d at 840 n.2, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 801 n.2, Chadd attempted suicide
while in a hospital prior to his preliminary hearing in the California case. Despite objections
by defense counsel, who indicated that "[t]his particular defendant's basic desire is to commit
suicide, and he's asking for the cooperation of the State in that endeavor," the trial court
accepted Chadd's guilty plea. Id. at 744, 621 P.2d at 839-40, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 801; see also
supra note 23, (discussing Chadd's reasons). On appeal, the State argued that Chadd had a
"fundamental right" to plead guilty, based on Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), but
the court rejected this attempted reliance on Faretta because of "the larger public interest at
stake in pleas of guilty to capital offenses." Chadd, 28 Cal. 3d at 747, 621 P.2d at 841, 170 Cal.
Rptr. at 802. As did the District of Columbia Circuit in Wright, the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia found that the scope of Faretta was necessarily limited:
The Attorney General in effect stands Faretta on its head: from the defendant's conceded
right to "make a defense" in "an adversary criminal trial," the Attorney General at-
tempts to infer a defendant's right to make no such defense and to have no such trial,
even when his life is at stake. But in capital cases, as noted above, the state has a strong
interest in reducing the risk of mistaken judgments. Nothing in Faretta, either expressly
or impliedly, deprives the state of the right to conclude that the danger of erroneously
imposing a death sentence outweighs the minor infringement of the right of self-represen-
tation resulting when defendant's right to plead guilty in capital cases is subjected to the
requirement of his counsel's consent.
Id. at 751, 621 P.2d at 844, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 805; see also Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807
(1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); People v. Ballentine, 39 Cal. 2d 193,
246 P.2d 35 (1952); Bishop v. State, 95 Nev. 511, 520, 597 P.2d 273, 279 (1979) (Manoukian,
J., dissenting). The Seventh Circuit stated in United States v. Taylor:
It does not inevitably follow, however, that this right of self-representation [found in
Faretta] comprehends any correlative right to preclude the trial from appointing counsel
and authorizing him to participate in the trial over the accysed's objection in order to
protect the public interest in the fairness and integrity of the proceedings.
569 F.2d 448, 452 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978).
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zen to waive those rights, even to his or her own detriment. For exam-
ple, because of the great importance to our society of jury trials as the
preferred methods of fact-finding in criminal cases, a defendant does not
have an absolute right to demand a trial by a judge.8 2 And, due to the
public's interest in seeing that justice is swiftly and fairly administered,
defendants may not indefinitely delay their trial, thereby waiving their
sixth amendment right to a speedy trial. 83 Nor may a defendant bar the
public from his or her trial because of the importance of giving the "as-
surance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned. ' s4
Similarly, a capital defendant should not have the absolute right to de-
mand execution when to do so would impinge upon the public's right to
demand that the State not violate the eighth amendment.8 5
When the factors enunciated in Whalem v. United States86 and United
States v. Wrght 87 are applied to the imposition of the death penalty, the
second and third factors protect fundamentally important societal inter-
esis. These factors require the court to weigh the objective "reasonable-
ness" of the defendant's decision in light of the "quality of the evidence
supporting" any defenses to the penalty that the defendant seeks to
waive.88 The stronger the possible defenses, the stronger must be the
State's interest in "forcing" the trial and post-conviction procedural pro-
tections on him.
These interests must then be weighed against the "quality" of the
82 Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965). In Singer the Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 2 3(a), stating that a defendant may only
waive a jury trial "with the approval of the court and the consent of the government." Id. at
24. As the Court itself explained:
The ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to
insist upon the opposite of that right. For example, although a defendant can, under
some circumstances, waive his constitutional right to a public trial, he has no absolute
right to compel a private trial .. "
Id. at 34-35. Moreover, the Court added, in a statement equally applicable to the death
penalty context:
The Constitution recognizes an adversary system as the proper method of determining
guilt, and the Government, as a litigant, has a legitimate interest in seeing that cases in
which it believes a conviction is warranted are tried before the tribunal which the Con-
stitution regards as most likely to produce a fair result.
Id. at 36. See generalv Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975). It is
through the criminal justice process that the death penalty acquires whatever legitimacy it
has. Acquiescing in one's own execution frustrates "the evolving standards of decency" that
may one day mark the end of capital punishment altogether. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (quoting
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 101 (1958)).
83 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1974).
84 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980)
(plurality opinion).
85 See Note, supra note 7, at 792 n. 115.
86 346 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862 (1965).
87 627 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
88 See supra text accompanying note 74; see also supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
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condemned person's "reasoning." 89 The term "quality" itself implies
the necessity for fine distinctions between barely perceptible gradations
in cognitive powers for which no hard and fast standard of competency
will suffice. The question is whether "mental illness" would be likely to
impair the decision. 9° Traditional notions of competency are inadequate
to cope with this question and, in particular, with the suicidal phenom-
ena associated with the death penalty.9 1
B. VOLUNTARINESS
The Rees standard92 not only requires an inquiry into the compe-
tency of the individual to make the decision, but also into the voluntari-
89 See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. The fourth factor, "the court's personal
observations of the defendant," is largely subsumed by the "quality of [the defendant's] rea-
soning" factor, since the court's observations should ideally confirm the fitness or unfitness of
the defendant to make his choice. This factor, however, should be given the least weight
because of its inherent subjectivity. In "close" cases the court's observations should be used
only to refuse to recognize the validity of the waiver. Unreviewable as they are, such observa-
tions should not be permitted to swing the balance toward execution.
90 See supra note 69.
91 As noted in Section II, many, if not most, of those who seek their own executions either
have symptoms of severe mental disorders or are suicidal for one reason or another. See supra
text accompanying notes 13-57. Although the relationship between mental illness and suicide
is uncertain, see Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180-81 (1975); cf. Note, supra note 7, at 797
n.127, there is substantial support in the psychiatric community for the proposition that, at
the very least, certain categories of suicides are the product of disease. See generaly Richards,
Constitutional Privacy, The Right to Die and the Meaning of Life: A Moral Analysis, 22 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 327 (1981). Richards observes that at least one class of suicides may be mentally
disturbed. He describes them as predominantly "young, disproportionately female, not un-
dertaking suicide in a way clearly calculated to succeed, and ambivalently hoping for help."
Id. at 395 (citations omitted). The frequency with which the condemned change their minds
about desiring execution, see supra note 57, indicates that they too may constitute a class of
attempted suicides "not undertaking suicide in a way clearly calculated to succeed, and am-
bivalently hoping for help." Id; cf. Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J.
1632, 1647-48 (1974) (discussing theory "that a decision to die by a terminal patient is a
manifestation of mental incompetency; hence that a terminal patient cannot competently
consent to any form of euthanasia").
"Competency to Stand Trial Instrument," designed by the Laboratory of Community
Psychiatry of the Harvard Medical School, lists thirteen functions "related to what is required
of a defendant in criminal proceedings in order that he may adequately cope with and pro-
tect himself in such proceedings" as required for effective competency evaluations, including
"self-defeating v. self-serving motivation (legal sense)." CENTER FOR STUDIES OF CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
AND MENTAL ILLNESS 99-100 (1973). As detected by the Laboratory, this copying mecha-
nism often is manifested by the intentional abandonment of legal safeguards:
This item calls for an assessment of the accused's motivation to adequately protect him-
self and appropriately utilize legal safeguards to this end. It is recognized that accused
persons may appropriately be motivated to seek expiation and appropriate punishment
in their trials. At issue here is the pathological seeking of punishment and the deliberate
failure of the accused to avail himself of appropriate legal protections.
Id. at 103.
92 See supra text accompanying note 59.
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ness of the decision itself. A person who, because of his present
circumstances, lacks the ability to make a rational choice, or one who is
under coercion or duress as a consequence of brutal and dehumanizing
conditions, simply cannot make an "intelligent and competent
waiver" 93 of his right to seek federal constitutional relief from his death
sentence.94 Any minimally professional evaluation of a prisoner's
"choice" to forgo post-conviction remedies must investigate the extent to
which this decision is an involuntary response to oppressive conditions of
confinement. While an individual's attempt to manipulate the machin-
ery of execution to assist him in performing "state aided suicide" is
surely grounds for concern, the States attempt to manipulate that ma-
chinery to coerce the individual to acquiesce in what amounts to state
conducted homicide is cause for alarm.
Constitutional standards for determining "voluntariness" have
been developed largely in the fifth amendment context. The test for
voluntariness is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, 95 the
conduct in question is "the product of an essentially free and uncon-
strained choice by its maker."'96 When conduct is challenged on volun-
tariness grounds, as with competency, the court must hold an
evidentiary hearing to determine the issue. It may have an obligation to
hold such a hearing even if the issue is not raised by the defendant or
counsel.97 The burden is on the State to prove voluntariness by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, 98 and the reviewing courts must make in-
dependent evaluations of the issue.99 When analyzed under these
general principles, the death row decision of the condemned to accept
death "with grace and dignity" rather than suffer increasing debilitation
93 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938).
94 See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 989, 1013 (1976) (Court "convinced" that Gilmore
"made a knowing and intelligent waiver of any and all federal rights"); id. at 1015 n.4 (Gil-
more's decision not made "as a result of the way he was treated in prison") (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
95 Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1963); United States v. White Bear, 668
F.2d 409, 412-13 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Seni, 662 F.2d 277, 282 (4th Cir. 1981);
United States ex rel Riley v. Franzen, 653 F.2d 1153, 1162-63 (7th Cir. 1981).
96 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307 (1963) (whether suspect's "will was overborne");
Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) (plurality opinion). This test has been
applied to both statements and non-verbal conduct. See United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d
1198, 1210-12 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (standard fifth amendment analysis used to determine admis-
sibility of defendant's conduct in turning over large sum of money obtained in heroin traffick-
ing to government).
97 See United States v. Powe, 591 F.2d 833, 842-44, 846-48, nn.28-34, 44-54 (D.C. Cir.
1978).
98 Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972); United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332,
1335 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Wiggins, 509 F.2d 454, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
99 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341,
348 (1976). See generalv Project, Twelfh Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1981-1982, 71 GEo. L.J. 339, 432-34 (1982).
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as a result of extremely brutal prison conditions cannot honestly be
deemed "free and unconstrained."
1 Length and Conditions of Confinement
Courts have long held that both the length of time spent on death
row' 00 and the conditions of one's physical environment can be so coer-
cive as to vitiate the voluntariness of his actions.' 0 ' In Brooks v. Flor-
ida,102 for example, the Supreme Court ruled that a confession was
involuntarily obtained from an inmate after a prison riot because of the
conditions to which he was subjected.10 3 Similarly, in Stidham v. Swen-
son,104 the Eighth Circuit, relying on Brooks, looked to the totality of
conditions to determine whether an inmate's confession to murder com-
mitted in the course of a prison riot was involuntary. 0 5
As discussed in Section II, the "realities" of life on death row con-
vey to the prisoner such a resounding message that no "spoken words"
of coercion need be expressed. Through the daily indignities both big
and small, the near total isolation which extends for years, the absence
of virtually all activities, and other brutal conditions, the death row pris-
100 See generally Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Turner v. Pennsylvania,
338 U.S. 62 (1949); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
tol Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1967) (per curiam); United States v. Koch, 552 F.2d
1216 (7th Cir. 1977); Stidham v. Swenson, 443 F.2d 1327 (8th Cir. 1971), revzdon other grounds
and remanded, 409 U.S. 234 (1972), modifed, 410 U.S. 904 (1973), remanded, 506 F.2d 478 (1974)
(en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941 (1976); Townsend v. Henderson, 405 F.2d 324 (6th Cir.
1968).
102 389 U.S. 413 (1967) (per curiam).
103 Brooks and two other men were thrown naked into a "windowless sweatbox" for fifteen
days, fed only a thin vegetable soup, and deprived of all visitors. 389 U.S. at 414.
104 506 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1974).
105 The court remanded the case to redetermine the issue of voluntariness based on nine
enumerated factors:
(1) The size of the cells in which Stidham was held in solitary confinement from
January, 1953, until September, 1954;
(2) The facilities available in said cells;
(3) The extent, if any, to which the cells were infested with cockroaches, rodents and
pigeons;
(4) Whether the cells were or were not poorly ventilated;
(5) Whether Stidham was permitted to visit with family or friends during the time
that he was held in solitary confinement;
(6) The extent, if any, to which Stidham was given food and water in the period
between the prison riot and his confession;
(7) Whether Stidham was given an opportunity to rest during the period from the
prison riot to his confession;
(8) Whether officials of the prison refused or neglected to mail a letter from Stidham
to his family in which he requested that counsel be appointed for him in the period
between the riot and his confession; and
(9) Such other matters as it may feel appropriate.
Id at 488. A similar "totality" approach is used to determine the constitutionality under the
eighth amendment of prison conditions generally. See infta notes 109-11 and accompanying
text.
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oner is "told" he is worthless and should be and will be dead. The
"choice" presented by the State is to die now or continue to be punished
for challenging the State's decision by the harsh regimes reigning on
death row.
Moreover, in United States v. Koch ,106 the Seventh Circuit acknowl-
edged that a confession obtained by offering a "choice" between two
equally unpleasant alternatives rendered the confession so obtained in-
voluntary despite full Miranda warnings. The court held that the impact
of the conditions of confinement and the prisoner's perception that by
confessing his conditions would be improved were irreconcilable with a
free and voluntary waiver. 10 7
It is important at this juncture to emphasize that the inquiry into
factors rendering a decision involuntary is discrete from that necessary
to prove an independent eighth amendment violation. The fact that
conditions of confinement may, in fact, be justifiable and lawful for
other reasons (such as security), hence not an eighth amendment viola-
tion, does not transform every decision made under those conditions into
a voluntary one. 08 Where conditions of confinement are truly torturous
106 552 F.2d 1216 (7th Cir. 1977). In Koch, the prisoner/suspect was confined in a six foot
by eight foot segregation cell or "box-car" and was deprived of all personal property, neces-
sary hygiene, and the ability to speak to others for six hours. He testified that he believed that
if he confessed, he would be moved to a less oppressive segregation cell in a less secure unit.
When the prisoner was asked whether he gave his statement voluntarily, the prisoner replied,
"It's either a question of getting out of the boxcar and going to I Unit (regular segregation) or
stay in the boxcar until trial and not give a statement." Id. at 1218.
107 See also Townsend v. Henderson, 405 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1968). Cases which reach a
similar conclusion about the need to evaluate the totality of circumstances in assessing a per-
son's voluntariness are not limited to the criminal justice system. A contract between two
parties in which one party has little or no meaningful choice will be declared void as "uncon-
scionable" after a review of all of the circumstances surrounding the transaction. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). It also has long
been the practice to invalidate a will when it is shown that the testator has been the subject of
"undue influence." See generally Hogan, When Does Inflence Become Undue?, 7 LoY. U. CHI.
L.J. 629 (1976); King, Undue Influence in Wills in Illinois, 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 457 (1935). Simi-
larly, the absence of meaningful alternatives to the terms presented by a party to a contract is
the key element in the defense of duress. See Sonnleitner v. C.I.R., 598 F.2d 464 (5th Cir.
1979); Jamestown Farmers Elevator v. General Mills, 552 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1977); LaBeach
v. Beatrice Foods Co., 461 F. Supp. 152, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Consol. Pretrial Proceed-
ings in Air West, 436 F. Supp. 1281, 1290 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
108 Again, a comparison to the law of contracts is instructive. The means employed to
accomplish duress need not be inherently wrongful; it is their use in a particular context that
makes that use wrongful. For example, threats to exercise legal rights in "oppressive ways"
may constitute duress. J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 264-65, 267 (2d
ed. 1977) (quoting Link v. Link, 278 N.C. 181, 194, 179 S.E.2d 697, 705 (1971)).
The distinction between voluntariness and the requirements for an eighth amendment
violation were recently confused by the court in Bailey v. Lally, 481 F. Supp. 203 (D. Md.
1979). In Bailey, prisoners incarcerated at the Maryland House of Correction sought damages
for injuries sustained as a result of their participation in a medical research program con-
ducted at the prison. The prisoners argued that the consent obtained prior to their participa-
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in violation of the eighth amendment, however, the involuntariness of
"waivers" of constitutional rights must be assumed. It is "intolerable that
one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert
another."' 0 9 Yet, that is precisely the predicament prisoners on death
row are faced with when the conditions are unconstitutional. In order
to challenge the constitutionality of their convictions or sentences, they
are forced to surrender their right not to be subjected to cruel and unu-
sual punishment while those challenges are taking place. It is the
cruelest of ironies and incompatible with the fundamental values of our
society to impose such oppressive conditions on the condemned that
they are compelled to "waive" further legal proceedings and then to
assert that such decisions are rational and voluntary. 110 While a com-
plete discussion of the constitutionality of death row conditions under
the eighth amendment is beyond the scope of this Article, the conditions
described in Section II are more than severe enough to render most
death rows unconstitutional under current eighth amendment
analysis. 111
tion was involuntary because of harsh prison conditions. Id. at 205. Indeed, conditions
relating to overcrowding already had been declared unconstitutional in Johnson v. Levine,
450 F. Supp. 648 (D. Md.), aj'din relevant part, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (per
curiam). The court in Baily, however, found that the conditions under which the consent
was obtained did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment and immediately concluded
that the consent was therefore voluntarily obtained. 481 F. Supp. at 220-21. Even assuming
the court was correct in finding no eighth amendment violation, its conclusion that the volun-
tariness inquiry was automatically satisfied was pure ipse dixit and contrary to established fifth
and sixth amendment principles.
109 Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968); see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 374 n.6 (198 1) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Furman, 408 U.S. at 288 n.37 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583, 592 (1926); Wojtczak
v. Cuyler, 480 F. Supp. 1288, 1304 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
110 The fact that a prisoner may genuinely desire to die rather than spend an interminable
period of time on death row does not make that decision any more voluntary than the pay-
ment of ransom to an extortionist:
[W]hen a parent pays a kidnapper because he wishes to save his daughter's life, his
choice may be the "expression of the most genuine, heartfelt consent." The consent is
real enough, the vice of it is that it was coerced in a manner that society brands as
wrongful and is therefore not deemed the product of free will. Consequently, in deter-
mining whether a transaction may be avoided for duress the main inquiry is to ascertain
what acts or threats are branded as wrongful.
J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, sufi'a note 108, at 263 (footnotes omitted).
111 The eighth amendment protects prisoners from more than just torture or barbarous
physical methods of punishment. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Hutto v. Finney,
437 U.S. 678 (1978); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171;
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958). Its ban applies to all punishments which do not
comport with "'broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and
decency.'" Hutto, 437 U.S. at 685 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)).
Contemporary standards of decency require that state prison systems "protect and safeguard
a prison inmate from an environment where degeneration is probable and self-improvement
unlikely because of the conditions existing which inflict needless suffering, whether physical
or mental." Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 393 (10th Cir. 1977); see also Pugh v. Locke,
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"Next friends" attempting to intervene on behalf of both Jesse
406 F. Supp. 318, 329 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aj'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Newman v.
Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978); Laaman v.
Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 323 (D.N.H. 1977); James v. Wallace, 382 F. Supp. 1177, 1181
(M.D. Ala. 1974); cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 327 (1982) (Blackmun, Brennan,
and O'Connor, JJ., concurring) (involuntarily committed mentally retarded patient may
have a due process right to "such training as is reasonably necessary to prevent a person's
pre-existing self-care skills from deteriorating because of his commitment") (emphasis in origi-
nal). Justice Blackmun in Youngberg emphasized that the maintenance of such "pre-existing
self-care skills" is "necessary" for the patient to maintain "his personal autonomy." 457 U.S.
at 328 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Conditions may be unconstitutional under this standard
either "alone or in combination." Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. In Rhodes, the Supreme Court
recently approved the "totality" approach already in use by a majority of courts. Id. at 363
n.10 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Hutto, 437 U.S. at 687; Ruiz v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 1115,
1139 (5th Cir. 1982); cf. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1982). See generally, Note,
Eighth Amendment Challenges to Conditions of Confement. State Prison Reform by Federal Judicial
Decree, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 288 (1979); Comment, supra note 48; Comment, Cruel But Not So
Unusual Punishment. The Role of the FederalJudiciay In State Prison Reform, 7 CuM. L. REv. 31
(1976). While each element contributing to the violation must be addressed, it is the "inter-
dependence of the conditions" that ultimately produces the violation. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 688.
The factors contributing to the "totality" approach include confinement without fresh air or
exercise, unsanitary conditions, inadequate clothing and bedding, denial of medical care, lim-
itations on visitation, irrational classification systems, overcrowding, disproportionate sanc-
tions, and failure to provide educational and vocational training. See supra note 105.
In the only reported decision squarely addressing the constitutionality of death row con-
ditions under the eighth amendment, Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. La.
1971), the court found that conditions on Louisiana's death row violated the eighth amend-
ment. Prisoners were held in virtual solitary confinement for over 23 hours a day without the
opportunity for regular outdoor exercise. Id. at 1129, 1131. Moreover, many had been living
under these conditions for as long as nine years. Id. at 1129.
An eighth amendment challenge to death row conditions was presented in Glenn v. Wil-
kinson, 309 F. Supp. 411, 412 (W.D. Mo. 1970), but was mooted when the state "voluntarily"
moved the inmates to a separate facility. Id. at 413. Three other reported decisions are sim-
ply too old to be of significant precedential value. See McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155
(1891) (not cruel and unusual punishment to be held in solitary confinement until execution);
Rosenberg v. Carroll, 99 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (confinement on death row in Sing
Sing not cruel and unusual using totality approach); cf. In re Anderson, 639 Cal. 2d 613, 631-
32, 447 P.2d 117, 129-30, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 33-34 (1968) (rejecting as unproven eighth amend-
ment challenge to death penalty alleging that it "drives men mad and to suicide" and that
long wait on death row causes "deterioration of personality").
Recently, there has been a spate of litigation over the constitutionality of conditions on
death row. No decisions have been reported yet. There have, however, been two consent
decrees. See Jacobs v. Britton, No. 78-309-H (S.D. Ala., 1980); Daniels v. Zant, No. 79-110-
MAC (M.D. Ga., June 5, 1981). Two other suits are still pending. See Delvecchio v. Lane,
No. 81-3208 (S.D. Ill., Apr. 2, 1981); Delvecchio v. Lane, No. 82-3208 (S.D. Ill., Dec. 20, 1982)
(denying defendant's motion to dismiss); Brown v. Hutto, No. 81-0853-R (E.D. Va., Feb. 23,
1982). One unreported state court decision found that the placement and retention of prison-
ers in solitary confinement solely because of their death sentences violated both their eighth
amendment rights and their rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Story v. Robin-
son, No. 75-29657 (Ct. of Common Pleas of Allegheny Co., Pa., June 28, 1976) (involving
confinement in cells for 23 hours a day). Other cases stemming from death row confinement
attack only particular practices. See,e.g., Otey v. Best, 680 F.2d 1231 (8th Cir. 1982) (uphold-
ing Nebraska prison regulation prohibiting prisoners on death row from attending group reli-
gious services with prisoners from general population due to increased security risk); Wilson v.
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Bishop 12 and Frank Coppola" 13 attempted to raise the issue of prison
conditions in challenging the voluntariness of their decisions to termi-
nate legal procdedings. Virtually without analysis, the courts, including
the Supreme Court, ignored the seriousness of these allegations. Where
a Frank Coppola is a named plaintiff in a class action suit challenging
the constitutionality of the conditions of his confinement,' 14 the involun-
tariness claim should be afforded primafade merit, requiring at least as
comprehensive an inquiry as is commonplace when the inmate's compe-
tency is challenged." 5
2. Psychological Stress and Mental Illness
Even if an individual is legally "competent," a waiver of rights by
him may be deemed involuntary if he is suffering from mental illness at
the time.116 Moreover, "[e]ven where it is only probable that the defend-
ant was mentally ill at the time," a waiver may be involuntary."17 As
illustrated in Section II, many of those who seek to cut off challenges to
their executions are suffering from various forms of mental illness.1 18
Apart from the suffering caused by death row conditions, the psy-
chological stress attendant to living under a sentence of death is an addi-
tional factor that must be weighed in the voluntariness inquiry: "The
Nevada Department of Prisons, 511 F. Supp. 750 (D. Nev. 1981) (upholding differential in
visitation policies between regular inmates and death row inmates as rationally based);
United States ex ret. Raymond v. Rundle, 276 F. Supp. 637 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (permissible to
limit death row inmate's visitation privileges since institution lacked sufficient personnel to
supervise visits); Labat v. McKeithen, 243 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1965), aj'd, 362 F.2d 747
(5th Cir. 1966) (dismissing condemned prisoner's complaint concerning mail censorship).
112 In addition to competency questions, Bishop's attorneys argued that his decision was a
product of duress caused by poor conditions on death row and of pain and drug intoxication
caused by his neglected medical needs. Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 811 n.2 (1979) (Marshall,
J., dissenting from vacation of stay of execution).
113 See supra note 54.
114 Frank Coppolla, at one time, was a named plaintiff in Brown v. Hutto, No. 81-0853-R
(E.D. Va., Feb. 23, 1982).
115 See discussion supra notes 58-91 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra note 7, at
795 n. 123 (suggesting that the approach taken to determine present competency "is equally
applicable to circumstances of involuntariness because in such circumstances the prisoner's
decision is no more 'rational' as intended by the Rees test than when the decision is the prod-
uct of mental disorder").
116 See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207-11 (1960); United States v. Robinson, 439
F.2d 553, 560-61 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (even if not rising to level of insanity, evidence of
mental illness rendered confessions involuntary). See generaly Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315, 322 n.3 (1959) (defendant had a "history of mental instability"); Fiske v. Alabama, 352
U.S. 191, 196 (1957) (defendant was of low mentality, if not mentally ill); Jurek v. Estelle, 623
F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc); Eisen v. Picard, 452 F.2d 860, 864-65 (lst Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
117 Jackson v. United States, 404 A.2d 911, 924 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979) (emphasis in
original).
118 See supra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
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tremendous mental strain of inexorably approaching a foreordained
death is unique to the condemned man. The imposition of this strain
violates society's standard that a man should be treated with human
dignity, and robs the condemned prisoner of his own human dignity and
psychological integrity." 119 Stripped of the "psychological integrity"
necessary to make a fully rational decision, death row inmates cannot,
with any intellectual honesty, be considered to be acting voluntarily
when they demand their swift executions.
3. The Nature of the Decison
Just as the standard for determining competency must be elevated
in the death penalty context,12 0 so the standard for determining whether
a condemned prisoner has made an intelligent waiver must be elevated
in the death penalty context because of the significance of the decision.
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Fay v. Noia'2 ' implicitly recognized that
the death penalty itself is a factor that may distort the inmate's decision-
making process. After being convicted of first degree murder and sen-
tenced to life imprisonment, the defendant in Fay chose not to appeal
for fear that he would be exposing himself to the death penalty if retried
and convicted. The Court held that "the grisly choice whether to sit
content with life imprisonment or to travel the uncertain avenue of ap-
peal which, if successful, might well have led to a retrial and death sen-
tence" excused what otherwise appeared to be both a knowing and
arguably intelligent waiver. 122 Similarly, in United States v. Jackson,123
the Court struck down a provision in the federal kidnapping statute that
permitted the death penalty if the defendant was convicted by a jury,
but only permitted life imprisonment if the defendant waived a jury
trial because of the undue pressure such a life or death decision places
on the accused.' 24 As one commentator concludes from these decisions,
"the Court's analysis makes it clear that whenever the possibility of the
death-penalty is a factor which may distort the defendant's decision-
119 Note, Mental Sufering Under Sentence of Death ,supra note 10, at 830 (footnotes omitted); see
also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 288-89 (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussing mental suf-
fering of "a person confined in prison awaiting death"); id. at 382 (Burger, C.J., Blackmun,
Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) ("a man awaiting execution must inevitably experi-
ence extraordinary mental anguish"); In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890); State v. Osborn,
102 Idaho 405, 433 n.1, 631 P.2d 187, 215 n.1 (1981) (Bistine, J., concurring and dissenting).
120 See supra notes 58-91.
121 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
122 Id. at 440.
123 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
124 Compare Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 217 (1978) (since the death penalty is not
involved, it is constitutional for New Jersey to provide for the possibility of a lesser term of
incarceration if the defendant pleads nonvult or nolo contendere to a charge of first degree
murder rather than going to trial).
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making process, stricter standards of waiver are appropriate."1 25 Elevat-
ing the standard of waiver is fully in accord with the Court's repeated
emphasis that "death is different,"1 26 as well as the common law's recog-
nition that the power of the State to circumscribe individual freedom of
choice rises in direct proportion to the dangerousness of the activity.' 27
Indeed, in the analogous context of experimentation with human sub-
jects, both the courts 128 and the executive 129 recognize that a prisoner's
ability to "consent" must be curtailed as the risk of harm increases.
125 White, Waiver and the Death Penalty. The Implications of Estelle v. Smith, 72 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1522, 1548 (1981).
126 See supra note 68.
127 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 938-39 (1978). Indeed, as this Article
argues in Section IV, the societal interest in ensuring that the death penalty is administered
fairly may prohibit the State from ever acknowledging the individual's right to demand
execution.
128 The court inKaimowitz v. Dep't ofMental Health, 42 U.S.L.W. 2063, 13 Cr. L. 2453, C.A.
No. 73-19434 (Cir. Ct. Mich., July 10, 1973), ruled that an involuntarily committed mental
patient could not consent to psychosurgery in part because the court determined that the
environment of a mental hospital rendered such decisions involuntary. The court based its
conclusion on many of the same factors eviscerating the voluntariness of a death row inmate's
"consent" to his own execution:
Although an involuntarily detained mental patient may have a sufficient I.Q. to
intellectually comprehend his circumstances ... the very nature of his incarceration
diminishes the capacity to consent to psychosurgery. He is particularly vulnerable as a
result of his mental condition, the deprivation stemming from involuntary confinement,
and the effects of the phenomenon of "institutionalization. . . ." Institutionalization
tends to strip the individual of the support which permits him to maintain his sense of
self-worth and the value of his own physical and mental integrity. . . . The privileges of
an involuntarily detained patient and the rights he exercises in the institution are within
the control of institutional authorities. . . . [S]uch minor things as the right to have a
lamp in his room, or the right to have ground privileges to go for a picnic with his family
assumed major proportions. For 17 years he lived completely under the control of the
hospital. Nearly every important aspect of his life was decided without an opportunity
on his part to participate in the decision-making process.
The involuntarily detained mental patient is in an inherently coercive atmosphere
even though no direct pressure may be placed upon him. He finds himself stripped of
customary amenities and defenses. Free movement is restricted. He becomes part of
communal living subject to the control of institutional authorities.
Id., slip op. at 25-28.
129 Seegenerally Research, 28 C.F.R. § 512.10-.22 (1981); Protection of Human Subjects, 45
C.F.R. § 46 (1978). For example, experimentation with prisoners must comply with regula-
tions promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services, which include compre-
hensive rules concerning informed consent. See 45 C.F.R. at § 46.302-.306. Consent is limited
to situations where there is minimal risk to the prisoner in recognition of the principle that
"prisoners may be under constraints because of their incarceration which could affect their
ability to make a truly voluntary and uncoerced decision." Id. at § 46.302. The Depart-
ment's explanation for the reason for these restrictions included the following:
In general, the prohibitions have been based on the demonstrable inequities of such re-
search and on the questionable voluntariness of prisoner consent. Though in theory the benefits
of such research are usually to society as a whole, prisoners included, only one segment of
society, prisoners, is asked to accept the research risks. Even ifTprisoner consent is obtained, the
circumstances of that consent in a confRed, restrictive, unattractive and boring environment, raise ques-
tions as to the voluntary nature of that consent. ...
43 Fed. Reg. 53,652, 53,654 (1978) (emphasis added).
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4. Lack of Education and Intellectual Capacity
Since an inmate who expresses the desire to be executed is waiving
potentially complex legal arguments that could be made in his behalf, it
is even more important in the death penalty context than in the context
of confessions that the inmate have the intellectual ability to compre-
hend those arguments. 13 0 While death row statistics concerning this fac-
tor are scarce, intelligence and levels of educational achievement among
prisoners as a class are quite low. 131 In Florida, for example, more than
half of the prison population is functionally illiterate. 132 More than fifty
percent read below the seventh grade level, and approximately twenty-
five percent have IQ's of less than ninety-a figure indicating at least
borderline retardation. 133 Under these circumstances, a court cannot
with confidence conclude that a decision to forgo post-conviction reme-
dies is "knowingly and intelligently" made.
In conclusion, before a death row decision to seek execution should
be accepted, there must be at least as comprehensive an inquiry into
voluntariness as is routine with competency. And, like the competency
inquiry, the determination of voluntariness must take into account the
significance and finality of the death decision and the coercive nature of
the forces uniquely pressing upon a condemned prisoner on death row.
As a society we must face the hypocrisy of stripping the condemned of
their humanity, of everything that normally pennits an individual to
make autonomous decisions, and then almost unblinkingly recognizing
the suffering inmate's decision to "die with dignity" as a free and volun-
tary choice of an autonomous individual. The State, in treating death
row inmates with such barbarity, is not free to divorce itself from re-
sponsibility for the "choices" that this barbarity inexorably produces,
whether or not the barbarity is justified.
130 See generally Crisp v. Mayabb, 668 F.2d 1127, 1135, 1139-40 (10th Cir. 1982) (defend-
ant's literacy relevant to legitimacy of waiver); Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d 929, 937-38, 941 (5th
Cir. 1980)(en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981)(confession involuntary, in part, due to
defendant's limited intelligence).
131 Bluestone and McGahee point out that not one of the 19 inmates on death row in Sing
Sing had an education better than the tenth grade, and some were illiterate. Bluestone &
McGahee, supra note 10, at 393. One inmate interviewed had an IQ as low as 60. Id. Lewis
estimates that 15% of death row inmates in Florida had IQ's of less than 90 and that the mean
education level was approximately the ninth grade. Lewis, supra note 10, at 211 (quoting P.
LEWIS & K. PEOPLES, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS: CASES AND
COMMENTS 1164-72 (1978)).
132 Hooks v. Wainwright, 536 F. Supp. 1330, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
133 536 F. Supp. at 1337-38.
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IV. THE INDEPENDENT FEDERAL INTEREST IN ENSURING THE
PROCEEDINGS AND THE PRESERVATION OF LIFE
The underlying assumption in Rees v. Peyton 134 is that a competent
inmate may voluntarily choose to terminate potentially life-saving legal
proceedings and allow the State's execution procedures to run their
course swiftly. One commentator analogized a condemned prisoner's
decision to "die with grace and dignity" to a disease-ridden hospital pa-
tient's so-called "right to die" by refusing to consent to extraordinary,
life-preserving medical procedures.1 35 Upon closer analysis, however,
this analogy actually requires governmental intervention in the death
penalty context and thus a modification of Rees. The "right to die"
cases do not automatically recognize an absolute right by a patient to
refuse treatment. On the contrary, they hold that the question of
whether the government will recognize the patient's death decision as
legitimate requires a balancing of interests.
While it has long been recognized that the right to bodily integrity
generally encompasses the right to refuse treatment, that right has al-
ways been qualified. For example, the Supreme Court has held that
even a parent's right to religious freedom must give way to the State's
right to require medical treatment, such as blood transfusions, for ne-
glected children. 3 6 Courts have also found governmental interests suffi-
cient in certain circumstances to require the giving of life-saving
treatment to fully competent adults. For example, in Application of the
President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 13 7 the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the power of a
hospital to perform a blood transfusion necessary to save the life of a
Jehovah's Witness. The court identified three governmental interests,
the protection of which under the circumstances had a greater import
than the individual's right to refuse treatment: (1) the State's interest in
the preservation of life and prevention of suicide; (2) aparenspatriae in-
terest in protecting the patient's minor children from "abandonment"
134 384 U.S. 312 (1966)(per curiam). Rees attempted to withdraw his second petition for
certiorari, but the Supreme Court refused pending a determination of Rees' competency. Id.
at 313-14. In so holding, the Court set forth the threshold standards for recognizing an in-
mate's right to refuse post-conviction challenges to his execution. See supra notes 58-59 and
accompanying text.
135 See Note, The Death Row Right to Die, supra note 10.
136 See Jehovah's Witnesses of Washington v. King County Hospital, 390 U.S. 598, reh'g
denied, 391 U.S. 961 (1967)(Court affirmed without hearing decision ordering blood transfu-
sions for children over parents' religious objection); see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, reh'g denied, 321 U.S. 804 (1944); cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (overturning
compulsory school attendance statute challenged by Amish parents, in part, because parents'
decision posed no threat to the physical or mental health of the children involved).
137 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
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by their parent; and (3) the protection of the medical profession's desire
to act affirmatively to save life. 138 Moreover, the individual's interests
were diluted because (1) the patient's decision was itself questionable
since she was in extremis when she made it; (2) she was the mother of a
seven-month old child; (3) death would be imminent without the trans-
fusion while with the transfusion there was a better than fifty percent
chance of survival; and (4) no dangerous or crippling operation was in-
volved. 139 Other courts balancing similar factors have reached the same
conclusion and ordered treatment. 14  In addition, since the seminal case
of Matter of Quinlan,141 courts have engaged in similar balancing of inter-
ests in determining whether measures that are merely life-prolonging
may be terminated so that a dying or comatose patient can "die with
dignity."1 42
In the death penalty context, application of the factors articulated
in the right to refuse treatment cases indicates that the governmental
interest in ensuring that the death penalty is administered in a constitu-
tional manner should virtually always take precedence over the inmate's
"right to die."
A. GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS
1. Preservation of Life and the Likelihood of Survival
The government's most powerful interest is the preservation of
life. 14 3 That interest does not, however, always exist to the same degree.
There is a "substantial distinction in the State's insistence that human
life be saved where the affliction is curable, as opposed to the State inter-
est where. . . the issue is not whether but when, for how long, and at
138 331 F.2d at 1007-08.
139 Id.
140 See, e.g., John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670
(1971). Seegenerally Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 1391 (1966).
141 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
142 See Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); Superintendent
of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); Eichner v.
Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980). See generaly Note, Comatose Conservatee-
Restrictions of Legal Capacity Substance or Procedure?, 7 W. ST. U.L. REv. 205 (1980); Note, In-
frmed Consent, supra note 67.
143 The government's interest in the preservation of life is embedded in a number of
sources:
The importance of the preservation of life is memorialized in various organic documents.
The Declaration of Independence states as self-evident truths "that all men . . . are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." This ideal is inherent in the Constitution of the
United States. ...
Matter of Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 19 n.1, 355 A.2d 647, 651 n.1 (1976). The right to life is also
inherent in the common law's proscriptions against homicide and suicide. Id.; see also Com-
monwealth v. O'Neal, 367 Mass. 440, 449, 327 N.E.2d 662, 668 (1975).
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what cost to the individual that life may be briefly extended."' 144 Where
the individual is all but comatose, the governmental interest in the pres-
ervation of life is small, because there is in fact little "life" left to pro-
tect.145 In the "right to die" context, because of the significance of the
decision, courts are careful to require proof that the patient "has no
hope of recovery" from a state of "permanent vegetative coma." For
example, in Custody of a Minor, 46 the court ordered, over parental objec-
tions, chemotherapy treatments for a child suffering from leukemia.
The chemotherapy program was required because it promised a "sub-
stantial chance for a cure and a normal life.' 47 The pessimism of the
parents and the suffering accompanying the years of required treatment
were insufficient interests to overcome the government's substantial in-
terest in maintaining the child's life under these circumstances. Other
courts have ordered treatment under similar circumstances where the
chance of recovery was statistically possible or where the treatments
themselves were not deemed "extraordinary" for other reasons.' 48
144 Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 425-26.
145 As the court in Eichner v. Dillon recently explained:
[Tihe patient in a permanent vegetative coma has no hope of recovery and merely lies,
trapped in a technological limbo, awaiting the inevitable. As a matter of established
fact, such a patient has no health and, in the true sense, no life, for the State to protect.
Thus, the use of a respirator, or any other extraordinary means of life support, under these
circumstances, does not serve to advance the State's interest in protecting health or life
and, hence, that interest does not defeat the privacy right asserted here.
73 A.D.2d 431, 465, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 543 (1980) (emphasis in original).
146 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978).
147 Id at 753, 379 N.E.2d at 1065. The court noted that chemotherapy statistically results
in a 50% chance of recovery. Id. at 738, 379 N.E.2d at 1057.
148 See Matter of Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454
U.S. 858 (1981) (ordering blood transfusions for incompetent, mentally retarded person suf-
fering from terminal cancer over parents' objection, because transfusions, like food, are not
extraordinary treatments); In re Vasko, 238 A.D. 138, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (1933) (ordering eye
removal operation over parents' objection where child suffered from cancer and such opera-
tions effected a cure in about 50% of the cases); cf. Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (defining "extraordinary" treat-
ment as the sort that promises merely to prolong life where there is no hope of recovery);
Matter of Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976) (permitting disconnection of respirator
only after medical prognosis revealed that patient was in a permanent, noncognitive, vegeta-
tive state); Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980) (in determining
whether a competent person has the right to terminate treatment, the balancing test must
take into account " 'the prognosis and. . . the magnitude of the proposed invasion' "). Pro-
fessor Tribe also has commented on this element of the balancing test:
[I1n the context of a claim to die in a dignified home environment rather than in the
demeaning tangle of technology that has become death's least human face, the state
would be hard pressed to advance a sufficient rationale for insisting on the medical
model.
More difficult for the individual would be an argument claiming not simply a right
to die with dignity when death was conceded to be imminent, but a right to die sooner
rather than later when ways to significantly prolong life appear available.
L. TRIBE, supra note 127, at 935.
G. RICHARD STRAFER
The governmental interest in the preservation of life also serves as a
limitation on individual autonomy in many other areas where ul-
trahazardous activities are involved. For example, many states require
motorcycle drivers to wear crash helmets even though the decision
would appear to affect only the individual driver.1 49 As a general prop-
osition, this interest can be stated as the "discourag[ement of] irrational
and wanton acts of self-destruction which violate fundamental norms of
society."'1 50 That interest is further enhanced when the individual is in-
stitutionalized and the duress factor is added to the equation.
1 5 1
The probability of success in overturning a death sentence or re-
versing the underlying conviction is quite high; thus, fully exhausting
post-conviction remedies cannot be deemed "extraordinary" under any
definition. Greenberg demonstrates that between 1972 and 1980 ap-
proximately 75% of the 2402 prisoners, who had been on death row
since the Supreme Court's decision in Witherspoon v. Illinois,152 "had left
death row or were certain to leave it because their convictions had been,
or soon would be invalidated."'' 53 Using Furman as the starting point,
the figure is estimated to be as high as 60% as of 1982.154 Despite these
statistics, the common perception among death row prisoners is that
their chance of success on appeal or collateral attack is impossible. 155
Moreover, the governmental interest in overriding individual au-
tonomy in the death penalty context is further enhanced by the possibil-
ity of mistake. In the last one hundred years there have been more than
seventy-five documented cases of wrongful conviction in capital cases,
149 See Kingery v. Chapple, 504 P.2d 831 (Alaska 1972); State v. Lombardi, 110 R.I. 776,
298 A.2d 141 (1972). See generally Note, Informed Consent, supra note 67, at 1647.
150 Eichner, 73 A.D.2d at 456,426 N.Y.S.2d at 537;see also Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743 n.ll,
370 N.E.2d at 426 n.1 1; Annas, Reconciling Quinlan and Saikewicz: Decision Making for the Termi-
nally Ill Incompetent, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 367, 373-74 n.19 (1979); Byrn, Compulsory Lfesaving
Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1975); Note, Suicide and the Compulsion
of LifAsaving Medical Procedures. An Anaysis of the Refusal of Treatment Cases, 44 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 285 (1978).
151 One commentator has stated:
The concern is that coercion of the terminal patient's decision will increase the
number and frequency of incorrect decisions by the patient-decisions which are irre-
versible-imposing societal costs greater than the costs if the responsibility were placed
on the individual's family, physicians and the state. If that were the case, it might be
argued that the state should override the patient's expressed will.
Note, Informed Consent,supra note 67, at 1657 (footnotes omitted); see also infta notes 201-07 and
accompanying text.
152 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (capital defendant's rights to an impartial jury under the sixth and
fourteenth amendments violated by removal of jurors who merely express their distaste for or
philosophical opposition to the death penalty).
153 Greenberg, supra note 33, at 918.
154 Id.; see also R. JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 19 n.7; Johnson, Under Sentence of Death.- The
Psychology of Death Row Confinement, 5 LAw & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 141, 143 n.7 (1979).
155 Johnson, supra note 10, at 140-4 1.
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resulting in at least eight executions.' 5 6 Greenberg also documents at
least six cases of erroneous convictions since Furman.157 While a "pris-
oner discovered to be blameless can be freed . . .neither release nor
compensation is possible for a corpse." 158
Although suffering as a result of death row confinement and from
living under a sentence of death, a condemned prisoner is hardly analo-
gous to a brain-dead, comatose hospital patient. As Custody of a Minor
illustrates, even the pain and often gruesome side effects of chemother-
apy are insufficient to override the government's interest in the preserva-
tion of life when there is at least a hope of survival. The condemned
have more than a hope.' 59
2. Ensuring the Fairness of the Proceedings
The government also has an overriding interest in guaranteeing
that the procedures adopted by state legislatures and construed by state
judicial systems comply with federal constitutional standards. This in-
terest not only requires state appellate review, but also federal review.
Thus, an inmate under sentence of death does not have the power to
"waive" these procedures, since they are not entirely "his" to waive.
As already discussed in the context of competency, state courts con-
sistently acknowledge that the State has so fundamental an interest in
the application of the death penalty that normal waiver rules, both at
trial and on appeal, do not necessarily apply. 16 Federal review of the
156 West, Psychiatric Reflections, supra note 13, at 419, 422; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. at 366-67 & n.156 (Marshall, J., concurring).
157 Greenberg, supra note 33, at 920 & n.69.
158 West, Psychiatric Refections, supra note 13, at 422.
159 See H. BEDAU, supra note 19, at 122-23 (even if one assumes that a death row "right to
die" may exist, Gilmore himself"was a long way from the paradigm of one who has this right:
someone with intractable pain, incurable illness, or severe impairment of facilities").
160 See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text; see also Massie v. Sumner, 624 F.2d 72, 74
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1103 (1981); People v. Powell, 40 Cal. App. 3d 107, 115
Cal. Rptr. 109 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 994 (1975); People v. Stanworth, 71
Cal. 2d 820, 834, 80 Cal. Rptr. 49, 59, 457 P.2d 889, 898 (1969); Goode v. State, 365 So.2d
381, 384 (Fla. 1979); State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 424, 631 P.2d 187, 206 (1981) (Bistline,
J., concurring and dissenting); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 383 A.2d 174
(1978). Stated another way, attempted waivers of post-conviction remedies should not be
recognized by the State any more than any other private agreement that contravenes public
policy as articulated in criminal procedures. See, e.g., McBrearty v. United States Taxpayers'
Union, 668 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1982) (agreement in which tax protest organization agreed to
pay defense and other expenses during member's incarceration for tax violations held illegal
as against public policy because it encouraged violation of federal law); In re Lloyd, Carr &
Co., 617 F.2d 882 (1st Cir. 1980) (agreement to use bankruptcy funds for bail illegal); Lach-
man v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying, 457 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1972) (contract illegal when it
would frustrate state's policy to encourage the disclosure of criroinal activity); Singer Sewing
Machine Co. v. Escoe, 179 Okla. 100, 64 P.2d 855 (1937) (contract between uncle of defend-
ant accused of embezzlement and Singer whereby uncle would give Singer promissory note in
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scrupulousness with which states comply with their duty is now a matter
of federal constitutional law. 16 1
Although divergent views on the application of the death penalty
were expressed in Furman v. Georgia ,162 the effect of the decision upon the
cases under consideration was to reverse each judgment insofar as it left
undisturbed the death sentence imposed. Four years later, in Gregg v.
Georgia,163 the Supreme Court attempted to distill the concerns ex-
pressed in Furman into procedural requirements necessary for any state
death penalty scheme to pass constitutional muster. 164 Gregg makes clear
that as a constitutional minimum in capital sentencing there must be:
(1) a procedure whereby the sentencing authority makes explicit the ra-
tionale for its conclusion that death is an appropriate remedy, and (2)
mandatory appellate review prior to execution based upon a record
where such factors have been specified.165 With some variations in tech-
nique, the second constitutional minimum, meaningful appellate re-
view, is present in the statutes of Texas, Florida, and Georgia which
exchange for Singer's promise to conceal crime held illegal because Oklahoma has expressed
stronger interest in the punishment of wrongful behavior than in the strict enforcement of
contracts). See generaly Northwest Airlines v. Alaska Airlines, 351 F.2d 253, 256 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966) (while it is desirable that "competent parties" be protected in
their rights to contract, "[t]hese rights are restricted by the transcendent rule that denies
enforceability to a private contractual provision which would require an unlawful act or
which, given effect, would gravely violate paramount requirements of public interest"); 6A A.
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1374 (1962). Decisions that go to the heart of the death penalty's
constitutionality should be illegal as against public policy just as agreements that discriminate
on the basis of race are. Cf Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1968); Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
161 See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420
(1980).
162 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972). On the same day Furman was decided, the Court also vacated
the death sentences in other pending cases. See, e.g., Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S. 845
(1972).
163 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
164 Justice Stewart, a member of the controlling plurality in Furman, explained as follows:
While some have suggested that standards to guide a capital jury's sentencing delib-
erations are impossible to formulate, the fact is that such standards have been developed.
When the drafters of the Model Penal Code faced this problem, they concluded "that it
is within the realm of possibility to point to the main circumstances of aggravation and
of mitigation that should be weighed and weighed against each other when they are
presented in a concrete case. . . ." While such standards are by necessity somewhat
general, they do provide guidance to the sentencing authority and thereby reduce the
likelihood that it will impose a sentence that fairly can be called capricious or arbitrary.
Where the sentencing authority is required to specify the factors it relied upon in reach-
ing its decision, the further safeguard of meaningul appellate review is available to ensure that
death sentences are not imposed capriciousy or in a freakish manner.
428 U.S. at 193-95 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Court repeatedly emphasized
the importance of appellate review in its decision that Georgia's scheme was constitutional on
its face. Id. at 198, 206.
165 Gregg, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976).
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were reviewed by the Supreme Court after Furman. 166
Appellate review guards against the arbitrary and capricious impo-
sition of the death penalty in a number of ways. Generally, review en-
sures that the death penalty is adjudged only for death-deserving
offenders who commit death-deserving offenses.167 For example, a re-
viewing court may find that the trial judge erroneously precluded the
defendant from offering evidence of a relevant character trait in extenu-
ation and mitigation showing that the accused is not death-deserving. 68
The reviewing court must also make sure that the sentencing authority
is not instructed to place undue weight on any evidence in aggrava-
tion, 169 and the reviewing court must be given a transcript of sentencing
proceedings to ensure that improper considerations are not allowed to
enter into the decision.' 70 In short, the Supreme Court requires that
where the trial procedures of a capital sentencing system are constitu-
tionally sufficient, appellate courts must ensure that those procedures
are properly followed.
When the state system proves deficient, however, federal interven-
tion may be necessary to ensure compliance with the eighth amend-
ment. Thus, in Godfr v. Georgia,171 the Court addressed Georgia's
application of the statute found constitutional only on its face in Gregg.
Specifically, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a statutory ag-
gravating factor-whether the murder in question was "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman"'172 -as applied to a case involving
multiple shotgun murders. The Court struck down the death sentences
administered under this factor on the grounds that the state system
failed in its duty to "apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary
and capricious infliction of the death penalty."' 173 State appellate courts
thus have an "obligation" to ensure that sentences within their jurisdic-
tion are constitutional; when they renege on this obligation, the federal
courts are justified in intervening. 74 Indeed, the Court has reversed nu-
166 See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 242, 276 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 262, 250-51;
(1976); cf. Louisiana v. Robinson, 421 So. 2d 229 (La. 1982) (illustrating by the irony of
improper argument at trial the importance of appellate review of death sentences for appro-
priateness in comparison with other death sentences); see aso Rosenberg v. United States, 346
U.S. 273, 301 (1953) (Black, J., dissenting) ("[w]ithout an affirmance of the fairness of the
trial by the highest court of the land there may always be questions as to whether these
executions were legally and rightfully carried out").
167 SeeJurek, 429 U.S. at 269-70 (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.).
168 See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
169 See Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410 (1982).
170 See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 361 (1977).
171 446 U.S. at 420 (1980).
172 GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(7) (Supp. 1981).
173 446 U.S. at 428.
174 Id. at 429.
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merous state court decisions upholding the death penalty. 175
A second, related federal interest is ensuring that a particular crime
is deserving of the death penalty. On three occasions, the Supreme
Court has struck down categories of offenses from the list of those which
states may punish with the sanction of death. 176 The duty of protecting
this interest, it must be emphasized, is peculiarly a federal one since it
entails a comparison of the evolving standards developed in the states
taken as a whole. For example, in Coker v. Georgia,177 the Court first
found that the imposition of the death penalty for the rape of an adult
woman was "grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the
crime of rape and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as
cruel and unusual punishment." 178 To fulfill its task of deciding
whether the punishment was unconstitutionally excessive, the Court
looked to the historical development of the punishment, legislative judg-
ments, international opinion, and the sentencing of juries across the
country. 179
Thus, the Supreme Court's death penalty cases since Furman unde-
niably establish a federal interest in requiring strict adherence by the
states to eighth amendment standards. 180 Indeed, the multi-state com-
parison required by the proportionality factor is peculiarly federal in
nature. While state systems at best may be expected to ensure propor-
tionality within their own borders, only the federal judiciary is capable
of guaranteeing nationwide uniformity.' 8 '
There is no comparable federal interest in the typical "right to die"
175 Id. at 438 & n.5 (collecting cases); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982);
Zant v. Stephens, 446 U.S. 410 (1982); Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982).
176 Coker v. Georgia, 443 U.S. 584 (1977); Eberhart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977); En-
mund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982).
177 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
178 433 U.S. at 592.
179 Id.; see also Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878) (in upholding public execution by
shooting for premeditated murder, the Court compared this nation's practices with those of
other countries). Other Supreme Court cases involving the eighth amendment have used a
similar comparative approach. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 96 (1958); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissent-
ing). More recently, in determining whether the Furman standard has been met, the Court
has repeatedly evaluated "capital sentencing system[s], when viewed in their entirety." Proffitt
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 254 n.1 1 (1975) (Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ.) (emphasis added).
180 See Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 951 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari) (acknowledging that "the interest in protecting the constitutional rights of persons
sentenced to death is properly characterized as a federal interest"); id. at 2035 (Marshall &
Brennan, JJ., dissenting) ("[b]ecause of the unique finality of the death penalty, its imposition
must be the result of careful procedures and must survive close scrutiny on post-trial review") (em-
phasis added); Gillers, supra note 10, at 23.
181 The federal courts, of course, have a more general duty to supervise the states to ensure
compliance with constitutional norms. See Sager, Forward- Constitutional Limitations on Congress'
Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 42-57 (1981).
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case in the medical context. There is no inherent need for national uni-
formity in state systems and standards governing the pulling of the plug.
Accordingly, unlike the dying patient, the inmate's "choice" must not
only be weighed against the State's interests in the preservation of life,
but the federal interest in ensuring compliance with the eighth
amendment.
3. Prevention of Suicide
As a corollary to its interest in the preservation of life, the State has
a strong interest in the prevention of suicide.' 82 Courts and commenta-
tors, however, dispute whether this interest comes into play in the con-
text of the dying patient. In Matter of Quinlan, for example, the court
believed there was "a real distinction between the self-infliction of
deadly harm and a self-determination against artificial life support or
radical surgery, for instance, in the face of irreversible, painful and cer-
tain imminent death."'u 3 Two factors generally identified in the dying
patient situation distinguish it from common law suicide: (1) the lack of
specific intent to die, and (2) the fact that death will result from natural
causes and not from a death-producing agent set in motion by the indi-
vidual himself.18 4
Whatever validity these distinctions may possess in the medical
context, they seem strained in the death penalty context. A patient may
truly want to live but may prefer facing certain death to suffering an-
other blood transfusion, and a condemned inmate may desire freedom
more than execution but may prefer facing execution to continued suf-
fering. These motivations for desiring death, however, are no more jus-
tifiable than those of a chronically unhappy person who, though truly
wishing he could be happy, desires death rather than a life of continuous
sorrow. Moreover, the method of fulfilling the death wish is not signifi-
cant. Placing a gun to one's head may take more courage than lying
down on railroad tracks, but the latter is still suicide even though the
individual does not put the train in motion. Thus, other decisions, such
as Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College , 15 have re-
182 See generaly Richards, supra note 91, at 372-73; Byrn, supra note 150, at 16-24 (1975).
183 70 N.J. 10, 43, 355 A.2d 647, 665 (1976).
184 Id. at 52-53 & n. 9, 335 A.2d at 670 & n.9; see also Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 743 n.l1, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 n.l1 (1977); Eichner v.
Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 467, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 544 (1980). See generall Byrn, supra note 150,
at 18.
185 The Court there stated:
And, conversely, it would follow that where attempted suicide is illegal by the common
law or by statute, a person may not be allowed to refuse necessary medical assistance
when death is likely to ensue without it. Only quibbles about the distinction between
misfeasance and non-feasance, or the specific intent necessary to be found guilty of at-
tempted suicide, could be raised against this latter conclusion.
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jected the Quinlan approach as one that ultimately places a value judg-
ment on the motivations behind the various kinds of suicides. 18 6 While
society is not seriously threatened when death is ultimately caused by
disease, the danger of such value judgments becomes clear in the death
penalty context where both the present state of suffering and the ulti-
mate cause of death are affirmatively brought about by the State.
Finally, even if a condemned inmate's refusal to continue legal
challenges to his or her execution is not technically suicide, that does not
mean that the government has no interest in refusing to recognize this
choice. The government does have an interest in refusing to enforce
punishments that serve no purpose. 8 7 Certainly deterrence is not served
by executing the individual who murdered only because he wished to
die but does not have the courage to do it himself. Even the State's
interest in retribution is diluted in the volunteer context. To the extent
that execution is sought only because the inmate considers it less painful
than life imprisonment, the State's interests in retribution are probably
better served by requiring life imprisonment.
4. Protecting the Integrity of the Profession
The State also has an interest in protecting the integrity of the legal
profession, just as it has an interest in "the maintenance of the ethical
integrity of the medical profession."' 8 8 A lawyer has an ethical obliga-
tion to intervene on his client's behalf when "[a]ny mental or physical
condition of a client. . . renders him incapable of making a considered
judgment on his own behalf."' 189 Allowing a condemned inmate to
331 F.2d 1000, 1008-09 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); see also John F. Kennedy
Memorial Hospital v. Heston, 58 NJ. 576, 279 A.2d 670, 672 (1971) (ordering transfusion for
traffic accident victim over family's religious objections, in part, because failure to do so
would condone suicide). See generaly E. DURKHEIN, SUICIDE 42-44 (1951); Richards, supra
note 91, at 374-77.
186 See Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743 n.11, 370 N.E.2d at 417 n.1 I (arguing that the underly-
ing State interest in the prevention of suicide only "lies in the prevention of irrational self-
destruction" and refusal of treatment by terminally ill patient deemed "rational" under the
circumstances); Eichner, 73 A.D.2d at 467, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 544 ("[s]uch decision, directed to
terminating the artifical prolongation of life, cannot be deemed 'irrational' in the sense gener-
ally connoted by the term 'suicide' ").
187 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)(a punishment is unconstitutional and
would gratuitously inflict pain "if it . . . makes no measurable contribution to acceptable
goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless infliction of
pain and suffering").
188 Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d
417 (1977); see also Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980); Custody of a Minor, 375
Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978); Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown
College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964). See generaly Byrn, supra
note 150, at 29-33.
189 Section 7-12 of the CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY provides:
Any mental or physical condition of a client that renders him incapable of making a
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waive further appeals may conflict with this ethical obligation, particu-
larly where the inmate initially sought to avoid the death penalty and
professes a desire to waive appeals only after a long incarceration on
death row. 190
5 Protection of the Family
The government also has an interest in the protection of third par-
ties affected by the death-producing choices of others. In particular,
courts often refuse to accede to a competent adult's decision to refuse
treatment where minor children will be abandoned or caused emotional
harm by the death of their parent. 19 Death is a particularly damaging
considered judgment on his own behalf casts additional responsibilities upon his lawyer.
Where an incompetent is acting through a guardian or other legal representative, a law-
yer must look to such representative for those decisions which are normally the preroga-
tive of the client to make. If a client under disability has no legal representative, his
lawyer may be compelled in court proceedings to make decisions on behalf of the client.
If the client is capable of understanding the matter in question or of contributing to the
advancement of his interests, regardless of whether he is legally disqualified from per-
forming certain acts, the lawyer should obtain from him all possible aid. If the disability
of a client and the lack of a legal representative compel the lawyer to make decisions for
his client, the lawyer should consider all circumstances then prevailing and act with care
to safeguard and advance the interests of his client. But obviously a lawyer cannot per-
form any act or make any decision which the law requires his client to perform or make,
either acting for himself if competent, or by a duly constituted representative if legally
incompetent.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 7-12 (1979); see also State v. Aumann,
265 N.W.2d 316, 318 (Iowa 1978) (CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILry in part justifies
lawyer in pursuing criminal appeal against the wishes of his client).
190 As the court explained in United States v. George in ordering transfusions for an adult
Jehovah's Witness who had objected to the treatment on religious grounds,
[i]n addition to the factors weighed by Judge Wright one consideration is added to the
scale. In the difficult realm of religious liberty it is often assumed only the religious
conscience is imperiled. Here, however, the doctor's conscience and professional oath
must also be respected. In the present case the patient voluntarily submitted himself to
and insisted upon medical care. Simultaneously he sought to dictate to treating physi-
cians a course of treatment amounting to medical malpractice. To require these doctors
to ignore the mandates of their own conscience, even in the name of free religious exer-
cise, cannot be justified under these circumstnces. The patient may knowingly decline
treatment, but he may not demand mistreatment.
239 F. Supp. 752, 754 (D. Conn. 1965); see also Application of President and Directors of
Georgetown College, 331 F.2d at 1009 ("The Gordian knot of this suicide question may be
cut by the simple fact that Mrs. Jones did not want to die. Her voluntary presence in the
hospital as a patient seeking medical help testified to this."); Byrn, supra note 150, at 31 (no
right to demand negligent treatment). See generaly Note, Informed Consent, supra note 67, at
1649 ("[a]rguably, once a patient submits to a life-sustaining treatment, the physician has an
obligation not only to him but also to society to maintain him, as a minimum, in his present
condition").
191 See, e.g., Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d at
1008; Holmes v. Silver Cross Hospital of Joliet, Ill., 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1972); United
States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965); cf. Eichner, 73 A.D.2d at 456, 466, 426
N.Y.S.2d at 537, 544; In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (C.P. Northampton County Ct. 1973)
(permitting adult to refuse treatment where no minor children involved); In re Estate of
Brooks, 32 111. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965) (same). Seegeneral/y Byrn, supra note 150, at 33-
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form of abandonment to children and may have a severe psychological
impact. 192
Although incarcerated, perhaps for the rest of his or her life, a first
degree murderer still possesses the right to some visitation. 193 Courts
have repeatedly overturned regulations and practices that prohibited
visits by children. 194 Moreover, at least one study indicates that chil-
dren do benefit substantially from visiting their incarcerated parents
even in maximum security situations. 195
B. INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST
Because of the finality of the death decision and the substantial
interests of the State in the preservation of life, in order for the individ-
ual's interests to control they must clearly and convincingly outweigh
the governmental interests. 96 The primary interest of the individual is
individual autonomy. 197 In the right to refuse treatment context, the
35; Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment.- Bodily Integrity Versus the
Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 228, 251-54 (1973).
192 Richards, supra note 91, at 390.
193 See Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 578-81 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041
(1981); O'Bryan v. County of Saginaw, Mich., 437 F. Supp. 582, 598 (E.D. Mich. 1977);
Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 320 (D.N.H. 1977); Hamilton v. Saxbe, 428 F. Supp.
1101, 1111 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886, 895 (N.D. Fla. 1976);
Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 327 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aJ'dand remandedsub nom. Newman v.
Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. deniedsub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S.
791 (1978); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 840 (M.D. Fla. 1975), adin relevant part , 563
F.2d 741, 748-49 (5th Cir. 1977); Mabra v. Schmidt, 356 F. Supp. 620, 630-32 (W.D. Wis.
1973); Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 141 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Wesson v. Johnson,
195 Colo. 521, 579 P.2d 1165 (1978) (en banc).
194 See, e.g., Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998, 1000 (7th Cir. 1976); Barnes v. Government of
the Virgin Islands, 415 F. Supp. 1218, 1234 (D.V.I. 1976).
195 J. Hughes, Play of Children in a Visiting Room of a Maximum Security Prison: A
Comparison of Behavior Before Play Materials Were Available and After a Play Situation
Was Provided (1975) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.) (avail-
able at University Microfilm, No. 75-13193). Visitation is also necessary to the death row
inmate if he or she is to avoid mental and physical deterioration. See Pugh, 406 F. Supp. at
327.
196 Eichner, 73 A.D.2d at 469, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 545; Matter of Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 379,
420 N.E.2d 64, 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 274, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
197 Richards explains "autonomy" as follows:
Autonomy, in the sense fundamental to the idea of human rights, is an assumption
about the capacities, developed or undeveloped, of persons as such-namely that persons
as such have a range of capacities that enables them to develop, want to act on, and, in
fact, act on higher order plans of action that take as their object one's life and the way it
is lived, and evaluate one's life in terms of principles of conduct and canons of evidence
to which one has given rational assent.
The cluster of capacities constitutive of autonomy include human capacities for lan-
guage and self-consciousness, memory, logical relations, empirical reasoning about beliefs
and their validity (human intelligence), and the capacity to use normative principles,
including, inter alia,principles of rational choice in terms of which ends may be more effec-
tively and coherently realized.
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right to autonomous choice is usually defined in terms of the "freedom
to choose to reject, or refuse to consent to, intrusions of his bodily integrity
andprz'vay."198 In the context of a criminal case, this right is usually
defined in terms of the right to dictate the choices made in one's own
defense. 199 Both rights, however, implicitly incorporate the notion of "ra-
tional assent. '
20 0
Although prison conditions may not always render a condemned
inmate's decision legally "involuntary," the ability of the inmate to
make a truly autonomous decision is nevertheless severely restricted by
the prison environment. The ability to make a "free" choice is directly
related to the "freedom" one already possesses. 20 ' As a "ward" of the
State, prisoners have even less residual rights than involuntarily com-
mitted mental patients.20 2 As the Supreme Court recently reiterated in
Hewitt v. Helms, prisoners are entitled to no more than "the most basic
Richards, supra note 91, at 339-40 (emphasis added).
198 Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 745, 370
N.E.2d 417, 427 (1977); see also Matter of Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 662-63
(1976); Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, 454-55, 458-59, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 536, 539.
199 In Faretta v. California the Court stated that
[t]he right to defend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear
the personal consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, who must be
free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. Al-
though he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must
be honored out of "that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law."
422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (citation omitted).
200 See supra notes 186, 197 and Section III.
201 See Garvey, Freedom and Choice in Constitutional Law, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1756, 1759, 1791
(1981). Garvey states:
If liberty involves the making of rational choices, its intelligent exercise demands prac-
tice. . . .According to this instrumental conception, the right to freedom may depend
on the ability to choose. . . . Id. at 1768.. . . If its essential premise is that freedoms
are protected in order to assist the individual's development into a healthy adult capable
of exercising choice in an unrestricted fashion, it has little relevance for the attribution of
liberties to the severely retarded, the very senile, or those who are comatose. . . . Id. at
1777. . . . Once the state, by involuntary commitment, has taken complete control of
the individual's life and required his total dependence upon the institution, it is no
longer in a position to make disclaimers about what the individual can expect. Its consti-
tutional obligation to care for the incompetent arises not from what it explicitly
promises-which may be nothing-but from what it does. By making the committed
person look solely to the state for the necessities of life, it has in the clearest possible
fashion created an expectation. The constitutional duty is coextensive with the degree of
the claimant's dependence; its duty to act as surrogate is not simply a moral obligation
but a constitutional one, equal to its duty not to interfere with private performance of
the same function. . . . The role the state plays should thus define the contours of its
obligation.
Id at 1790-91.
202 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978) (prisoner described as "a ward of the
state for whom society assumes broad responsibility"); cf. Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct.
2452,- (1982) ("[p]ersons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more con-
siderate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confine-
ment are designed to punish").
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liberty interests. ' 20 3 Furthermore, those rights most restricted by the
prison environment are those that traditionally underlie the right to re-
fuse treatment-privacy and rights of expression in general. 20 4 The
State may thus validly regulate such aspects of intimacy as personal hy-
giene,20 5 rights of procreation,20 6 and the like.20 7 Finally, current Fed-
eral Bureau of Prisons regulations permit the government to force feed
inmates on hunger strikes.
20 8
With autonomy necessarily curtailed and the inmate under the cus-
tody of the State, the condemned inmate's right to refuse legal assistance
is far less than that of a free citizen or even of a defendant not yet con-
victed. Because the government's interests in preserving life, safeguard-
ing the integrity of the proceedings and the legal profession, and
protecting the rights of third parties affected by "suicidal" decisions is
substantial, the individual's right to personal autonomy is insufficient to
prove clearly and convincingly a significant countermeasure.
V. THE PROBLEM OF STANDING
A. "NEXT FRIENDS"
When the competency of the inmate is at issue or when the volunta-
riness of the inmate's decision is questioned, "next friends" may properly
203 103 S. Ct. 864, 869 (1983). See generally Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974);
Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
204 See general, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545-46 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Pris-
oners' Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977); Pell, 417 U.S. at 822; St. Claire v. Cuyler, 634 F.2d
109, 112 (3d Cir. 1980).
205 See Hill v. Estelle, 537 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1976); Brooks v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 652
(5th Cir. 1970).
206 See Tarlton v. Clark, 441 F.2d 384 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 934 (1971); Lyons v.
Gillian, 382 F. Supp. 198, 201 (N.D. Ohio 1974). The significance of the limitations on the
right to procreation in the privacy context is enhanced if one construes the Supreme Court's
decisions in the privacy area as being limited to marriage, privacy in the home, and the right
to use contraceptives. See generaly Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Eichbaum,
Towards an Autonomy-Based Theoy of Constitutional Privacy: Beond the Ideology of Familial Pn'vay,
14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 361, 384 (1979).
207 See, e.g., Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52, 53-54 (7th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (rejecting
attempted reliance on Roe v. Wade, upholding right to female guards to conduct pat-down
search of male inmate, excluding genital area since "[o]ne of the most important rights which
is necessarily limited as a result of one's incarceration is the right to be free of unwanted
intrusions into one's personal privacy"); United States v. Stine, 675 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1982)
(rejecting contention that probation condition requiring defendant to participate in psycho-
logical counseling violated right of mentation and right of privacy); see also Bonner v. Cough-
lin, 517 F.2d 1322 (7th Cir. 1975),modiftd, 545 F.2d 565 (1976) (en banc),cert.denied, 435 U.S.
932 (1978).
208 See Medical Services, 28 C.F.R. § 549.65 (1982). Subpart (c) provides: "When, after
reasonable efforts, or in an emergency preventing such efforts, a medical necessity for immedi-
ate treatment of a life or health threatening situation exists, the medical officer may order
that treatment be administered without the consent of the inmate." Id. at § 549.65(c);sealso
Suicide Prevention Program, 28 C.F.R. § 549.70-549.71 (1982).
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bring post-conviction challenges to sentences of death. 20 9 Indeed, 28
U.S.C. § 2242 has long incorporated the "next friend" concept by ex-
plicitly providing that an "[a]pplication for a writ of habeas corpus shall
be in writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is in-
tended or by someone acting in his behalf."' 210 Since such actions are initi-
ated on the inmate's behalf rather than as independent actions by third
parties, no standing problem as such is actually presented. The key to
"standing" is almost always demonstrating the inmate's incompetency
or inability to present the action himself, not on demonstrating the
"next friend's" qualifications. 211
While challenges to competency are common, those based on con-
ditions of confinement have met with mixed results. The Ninth Circuit
recently approved a next friend petition brought by an out-of-state at-
torney retained by an inmate's wife in Warren v. Cardwell.212 Since the
prison was in a "locked down" condition, the court viewed the situation
as "urgent" enough to warrant the unusual intervention. 213 In Evans v.
Bennett, however, a federal district court concluded that there was "no
indication of any intervening physical or mental disability" present to
justify intervention despite complaints made about the conditions of
confinement. 2 14 The court concluded that instead of raising a question
about the voluntariness of Evans' decision to waive legal challenges to
his execution, poor prison conditions simply made this decision more ra-
209 See United States cx rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115, 1126 n.8 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 921 (1975); Collins v. Tresger, 27 F.2d 842, 843 (9th Cir. 1928); United States
ex rel. Bryant v. Houston, 273 F. 915, 916 (2d Cir. 1921); United States ex ret. Funaro v.
Watchorn, 164 F. 152, 153 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1908); United States cx rel. Kirk v. Kirkpatrick,
330 F. Supp. 821, 822 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1971); In re Ferrens, 8 F. Gas. 1158, 1159 (C.C.S.D. N.Y.
1869) (No. 4746); R. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS § 5.1, at 55-56 (2d ed. 1969). See
generally Hays v. Murphy, 521 F. Supp. 1290, 1293 (E.D. Okla. 1981), rev'don othergrounds, 663
F.2d 1004 (10th Cir. 1981); Webber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1978); Davis v. Austin,
492 F. Supp. 273 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Note, supra note 7, at 779-80.
210 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1971) (emphasis added).
211 In determining the standing of those seeking to act as next friend, the courts review the
relationship of the petitioner to the prisoner in order to distinguish "intruders or uninvited
meddlers" from persons with a genuine and legitimate interest in the prisoner's welfare. Hous-
ton, 273 F. at 916; accord Wilson v. Dixon, 256 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1958); see also Webber,
570 F.2d at 513-14; Hays, 521 F. Supp. at 1293; Davis, 492 F. Supp. at 275-76. Both relatives
and former attorneys have routinely been accepted under this standard. See, e.g., Lenhard v.
Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306, 1310 (1979) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice)(granting temporary stay of
execution); United States ex ret. Funaro v. Watchorn, 164 F. 152 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1908); cf.
Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 271 (1953) (per curiam).
212 621 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1980).
213 Id. at 321 n.1; see also Morris v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Va. 1975) (jail
house lawyer-petitioner's co-defendant-permitted to file petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2242 where prison authorities had restricted inmate's ability to communicate verbally or by
mail with him).
214 467 F. Supp. 1108 (S.D. Ala.), stay ofexecution denied, 440 U.S. 987 (1979).
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tional.2 15 Confessing with a gun pointed at one's head may also be "ra-
tional," but it is hardly voluntary. The decision in Evans points out the
need for more principled approaches to the effect of conditions of con-
finement on the decision-making process. Under the analysis presented
in previous sections of this Article, standing should be as routinely
granted to make such challenges as it is granted to those questioning
traditional notions of competency.
B. INDEPENDENT THIRD PARTY STANDING
The question of whether third parties have independent standing to
intervene to protect their own interests has not been discussed in the
death penalty context. It has arisen, however, in the right to refuse
treatment cases. In Matter of Quinlan, for example, the court permitted
the father of a comatose adult woman to assert not only her "right to
die" as her guardian, but his rights as a parent.2 16 Similarly, in Matter of
Storar,2 17 the court granted standing to the director of the medical center
where an incompetent patient was being treated. The mother of the
patient had requested that blood transfusions be discontinued. Over a
dissent, the majority held that the medical center served the role of a
personal physician and had a legitimate concern about potential future
liability strong enough to justify standing to intervene. 2 18
215 467 F. Supp. at 1110; cf. Davis, 492 F. Supp. at 277, 278 n.2 (discussing poor medical
care and other inadequate prison conditions as basis for next friend standing but finding
them insufficient to question competency; question mooted when inmate changed his mind
and retained attorneys).
216 70 N.J. 10, 34-35, 355 A.2d 647, 660-61 (1976). The court's discussion, however, was
somewhat ambiguous:
Although generally [a] litigant may assert only his own constitutional rights, we
have no doubt that plaintiff has sufficient standing to advance both positions. . . . And
our courts hold that where the plaintiff is not simply an interloper and the proceeding
serves the public interest, standing will be found ...
The father ofKaren Quinlan is certainly no stranger to the present controversy. His
interests are real and adverse and he raises questions of surpassing importance. Mani-
festly, he has standing to assert his daughter's constitutional rights, she being incompe-
tent to do so.
Id. (citations omitted). Indeed, later the court seemed to reject the father's claim for in-
dependent standing: "Regarding Mr. Quinlan's right of privacy, we agree with Judge
Muir's conclusion that there is no parental constitutional right that would entitle him to a
grant of relief in propia persona." Id. at 42, 355 A.2d at 664 (citing Matter of Quinlan, 137
N.J. Super. 227, 266, 348 A.2d 801, 822 (1976)). Yet, in addressing the court's broad equity
power, the court implied that not only Karen Quinlan herself, but "a parent, or a doctor, or a
hospital, or a State" could invoke that power. Id. at 44, 355 A.2d at 665-66.
217 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
218 Id. at 374 n.3, 420 N.E.2d at 69 n.3, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 271 n.3; see 1d. at 388-89, 420
N.E.2d at 77, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 279 (Jones,J., dissenting); see also Application of President and
Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1015 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978
(1964) (Burger, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en bane, discussing whether standing
may be asserted by physician or hospital based on relationship between doctor and patient).
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In Singleton v. Wu09, 2 19 four Justices of the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged the standing of physicians to challenge a Missouri statute outlaw-
ing abortions which are not "medically indicated. ' 220 The Court
repeatedly emphasized that the importance of the confidential relation-
ship existing between doctor and patient justifiedjus tertii standing. 221
Finally, in deciding third party standing issues, the Court weighs
the ability of the first party to assert his or her own rights.222 Clearly,
this ability need not be so lacking as to justify traditional "next friend"
standing. Conduct that "chills" the assertion of rights may be a suffi-
cient disability to permit intervention.223 The attorney-client relation-
ship is "chilled" by death row conditions, and the condemned inmate is
plainly suffering sufficient disabilities to support third-party
intervention. 224
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of the complexity of the moral and legal issues involved, the
shallowness of the legal analyses by both courts and commentators in
considering attempts to "volunteer" for execution is surprising. More-
over, the courts' treatment of these issues is in stark contrast to their
treatment of similar issues in other contexts. In the less severe and obvi-
ously less permanent context of experimentation on prisoners, courts
219 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
220 Id. at 113-17. See generally Note, The Generalized Grievance Restriction: Pmdential Restraint or
Constitutional Mandate, 70 GEo. LJ. 1157 (1982); Note, Standing to Assert Constitutiona/Jus Tertii,
88 HARV. L. REV. 423 (1974).
221 For example, Justice Blackmun cautioned:
Like any general rule, however, this one should not be applied where its underlying
justifications are absent. With this in mind, the Court has looked primarily to two fac-
tual elements to determine whether the rule should apply in a particular case. Thefrst is
the relationship of the litigant to the person whose right he seeks to assert. If the enjoyment of the
right is inextricably bound up with the activity the litigant wishes to pursue, the court at
least can be sure that its construction of the right is not unnecessary in the sense that the
right's enjoyment will be unaffected by the outcome of the suit. Furthermore, the relation-
ship between the litigant and the third party may be such that the former is fully, or very neary, as
eJective a proponent of the right as the latter.
428 U.S. at 114-15 (emphasis added); see id. at 115 (stressing "confidential" nature of the
relationship); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1972) (stressing "advocate" relation-
ship and "impact of the litigation on the third-party interests"); see also Comment, supra note
15, 1286 n. 141 ("innocent friends and relatives of condemned murderers have been known to
commit suicide in apparent reaction to the executions') (citations omitted). See generall An-
not., 91 A.L.R. 2d 618, 627-30 (1963) (noting numerous exceptions to general rule prohibiting
attorney from prosecuting appeals against the clients' wishes where attorney had sufficient
interest, such as fees or compensation, at stake).
222 Wuf, 428 U.S. at 115-16.
223 Id. at 117. The Court also pointed out that the imminent mootness of a pregnant
woman's claim also supported intervention. Id. Execution of the condemned prisoner obvi-
ously would also moot his claims.
224 See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
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and the executive branch freely acknowledge the inherent coerciveness
of institutional environments. Similarly, in the context of those suffer-
ing from physical or psychological ailments, courts throughout the coun-
try limit an adult's "right to die" by imposing upon that decision a
plethora of safeguards. Even in the context of waivers of legal proceed-
ings, courts recognize that standards of voluntariness ought to be mea-
sured as a function of the importance and permanence of the decision at
issue. These concepts are not yet fully interwoven into death penalty
jurisprudence where the government's interests in ensuring the fairness
of the proceedings, preventing suicide, and safeguarding the integrity of
the legal profession are even more important than in these other con-
texts. At stake is not simply an individual's right to prevent the State
from maintaining his life, but the State's right actively and lawfully to
terminate that life.
As long as we are willing to grant the State that awesome power,
the torturous environment of death rows across the country and the var-
ious suicidal dysfunctions often attendant to prisoners guilty of murder
must not be casually ignored in the name of consent and free will, as if
the prisoner were waiving nothing more than the right to a jury trial for
petty larceny. Unless we are willing to countenance state-imposed
homicide of individuals tortured into consenting to their own execu-
tions, the problem of voluntariness under harsh death row regimes de-
serves at least as full treatment as issues of present competency, and the
issues of competency themselves must be flexible enough to take account
of the unique pressures of living under a sentence of death.
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